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When 1 + 1 No Longer Equals 2: The New Math of 
Legal “Additionality” Controlling World and U.S. 
Global Warming Regulation 
 
Steven Ferrey* 
I. THE NEW POLICY CONFLICT, BUT NO LEGAL 
CONTRADICTION, BETWEEN REGULATION OF CARBON 
REDUCTION AND RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS 
Control of carbon emissions to the atmosphere is the 
environmental issue of this decade—perhaps of this entire generation. 
Its importance has been equated to the survival of the planet: “The 
stakes, for all life on the planet, surpass those of any previous 
crisis.”1 It may all come down to the novel legal concept of 
“additionality.” 
All developed nations across the world, except the United States, 
have entered the Kyoto Protocol to reduce world carbon emissions.2 
                                                          
© 2009 Steven Ferrey. 
*Steven Ferrey is Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School and 
has been Visiting Professor at Boston University School of Law and 
Harvard Law School. Professor Ferrey has served for the past 15 years as 
the primary legal advisor to the World Bank and the U.N. on their carbon 
control and renewable energy projects in developing nations. He is the 
author of six books and more than 75 articles on the energy-
environmental legal and policy interface. See, e.g., STEVEN FERREY, THE 
LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER (18th ed. 2009) (three-volume book updated 
annually); STEVEN FERREY & ANIL CABRAAL, RENEWABLE POWER IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: WINNING THE WAR ON GLOBAL WARMING (2006). His 
articles on energy policy during the past five years have appeared in law 
reviews at Harvard, Duke, William & Mary, University of Virginia, Boston 
College, Stanford, University of California Berkeley, and N.Y.U. 
 1. James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should 
Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 229 (2008), 
http://www.bentham.org/open/toascj/openaccess2.htm (follow “Click 
here to view the contents(2008)” hyperlink; then follow article hyperlink; 
then follow “DOWNLOAD” hyperlink). 
 2. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
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Even in the United States, approximately half of the states have 
embarked on aggressive state-level carbon restriction laws.3 
Collectively, the objectives of these international and state carbon 
laws are to restrict substantially, even radically, the emissions of the 
primary global warming gas, carbon dioxide (CO2), which is most 
abundantly emitted in energy production.4 
Global carbon concentration in the atmosphere is now 
accelerating at almost four times the rate of the 1990s.5 To make 
mitigation policies successful, these undertakings must address the 
energy sector and they must transition from the traditional primary 
reliance on fossil fuel combustion to greater use of renewable energy 
sources. Renewable energy sources either do not produce carbon or, 
by employing some methane or biomass resources, are potentially 
carbon-neutral.6 Therefore, the success of carbon reduction initiatives 
is intimately tied to shifting the power generation base of both 
developed and developing countries to a more balanced mix of 
renewable energy generation.7 
The greatest concerns about carbon trading among stakeholders 
                                                          
List of Annex I Parties to the Convention, 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.ph
p (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter List of Annex I Parties]; Dean 
Scott, Global Carbon Concentrations Accelerating at Almost Four Times 
Growth Rate of 1990s, 39 ENV’T REP. 1967 (2008). 
 3. See discussion infra Parts III and IV. 
 4. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, EMISSIONS OF 
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2005: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2-3, 
(2007), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/summary/pdf/0573(2005)es.pd
f; Carbon Dioxide Info. Analysis Ctr., Frequently Asked Global Change 
Questions, http://cdiac.ornl.gov/faq.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). 
 5. Scott, supra note 2, at 1967. 
 6. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Landfill Methane Outreach Program 
(LMOP): Benefits of LFG Energy, http://www.epa.gov/lmop/benefits.htm 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2008) (“It is estimated that . . . roughly 60-90% of the 
methane emitted from . . . landfill[s] [can be captured and used as fuel].”); 
see also infra tbl.1 (detailing U.S. GHG emissions). By absorbing carbon 
while it is growing, certain biomass only releases the stored carbon when 
it is burned to produce power. Angela Morrison Uhland, Improving 
Regulations for Biomass-Based Electrical Generating Facilities, 23 NAT. 
RES. & ENV’T, Summer 2008, at 15, 16. 
 7. See generally FERREY & CABRAAL, supra note * (outlining the 
importance of developing countries in any attempt to reduce global 
warming gases); Steven Ferrey, Why Electricity Matters, Developing Nations 
Matter, and Asia Matters Most of All, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 113, 142 
(2007). 
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are the requirements of “additionality” and verification of offsets.8 
Additionality creates a major legal and regulatory disconnect in these 
carbon laws. Additionality is the requirement in most carbon control 
statutes or regulations that limits additional or non-business-as-
usual carbon-reduction projects to those that legally qualify to create 
carbon “offsets.” Offsets create tradable credits for compliance with 
carbon policies.9 Such offset credits, which are embodied in all 
international and U.S. state carbon laws to date, can be earned and 
traded among regulated industries, such as power generators, for 
compliance with the carbon laws. They become the common currency 
of carbon. However, some of these carbon programs have specifically 
excluded all renewable energy projects from being deemed additional 
and thereby eligible as carbon currency.10 
The legal rationale is that renewable power is abundantly 
promoted by a host of other legal incentives, from tax credits and 
accelerated tax depreciation to creation of Renewable Energy Credits 
(“RECs”) or system benefit charges to promote renewable power.11 
Therefore, it is assumed that they would be constructed anyway and 
are not additional or justified due solely to a carbon program. To allow 
renewable projects to legally double-dip, as both renewable projects 
and carbon reduction projects, even though they truly serve dual 
purposes technically, is to fail additionality. The first carbon 
reduction program in the United States, the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (“RGGI”), commencing in January 2009 in ten northeastern 
states, takes this position by barring renewable energy projects from 
being additional.12 
                                                          
 8. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1048, CARBON 
OFFSETS: THE U.S. VOLUNTARY MARKET IS GROWING, BUT QUALITY ASSURANCE 
POSES CHALLENGES FOR MARKET PARTICIPANTS 25 (2008) [hereinafter 
CARBON OFFSETS], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081048.pdf. 
 9. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE MODEL RULE § XX-
10.3(d) (Final Draft with Corrections Jan. 5, 2007) [hereinafter RGGI 
MODEL RULE], available at 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/model_rule_corrected_1_5_07.pdf; U.S. CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL34634, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CLIMATE CHANGE 
AND INTERNATIONAL DEFORESTATION: LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS 5, Tbl.1 (Aug. 22, 
2008) [hereinafter CRS REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE], available at 
http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRs/abstract.cfm?NLEid=2081. 
 10. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-10.3(d)(2). 
 11. For a discussion of RECs, see infra Part VI.C. For a discussion of 
other tax incentives, see STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, 
supra note *, at §§ 3:50.1–3:54. 
 12. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-5.3(d). 
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The conundrum of excluding renewable energy projects from 
being additional is that it discourages the very projects that must be 
created in order to shift the power-generating base to a less carbon-
intense emission composition. International programs take a contrary 
regulatory legal position. The international Kyoto Protocol embodies 
the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) offset program and 
specifically allows renewable energy projects in developing countries 
to qualify.13 Nonetheless, the choice made under CDM has resulted 
primarily in projects that do not feature renewable energy projects.14 
This article analyzes the legal issues and policy conundrums 
created by the new legal meta-metric of additionality for carbon 
control—comparing the U.S. laws against the Kyoto Protocol. Section 
II examines which gases are regulated by these programs and the 
pivotal role of renewable energy as the alternative to mitigate 
prodigious creators of CO2. It examines the various emerging U.S. 
state carbon laws and programs, how they choose to qualify legal 
offsets, and whether they require additionality. The most prominent 
programs are analyzed in depth. Section III explores the legal 
elements of the ten-state RGGI program, the first U.S. carbon 
regulation of the power sector. Section IV turns to the high-profile 
California carbon-regulation program. Section V analyzes all other 
U.S. mandatory and voluntary carbon-restriction programs. 
Section VI examines the state legal programs that make 
renewable power projects ineligible for additionality. Invoking a 
comparison with international law, Section VII dissects the Kyoto 
Protocol and how it legally resolves the issues of eligibility of 
renewable power options, additionality, and any resultant shift in the 
power generation base. 
Against the above analysis, Section VIII probes the legal 
substance of additionality in both the United States and international 
contexts. It probes the legal and regulatory nuances, and finds 
analogous precedent in recent 2008 U.S. court decisions on the 
legality of pollution cap-and-trade programs. It then contrasts the 
                                                          
 13. See infra Part VII.D. 
 14. Most CDM projects which must be sited in developing countries 
(Non Annex 1) are projects to reduce HFC-23, a refrigerant. All HFCs 
collectively constitute less than 1% of GHGs, but they have received 
almost half of the investment in mitigation dollars. Jeffrey Ball, Gas Leak: 
Kyoto’s Caps on Emissions Hit Snag in Marketplace—U.N. Mulls How to Fix 
Pollution-Credit System; ‘Expecting Too Much’, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at 
A1. 
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legal architecture of carbon regulation in the United States and 
worldwide. Carbon regulation is not an unlimited technical nor legal 
exercise: climate scientists warn of very tight time frames, which then 
are applied to the legal options and regulatory construct. With the 
clock on global warming running and time limited, policy alternatives 
and options conclude this article. 
II. POWER GENERATION AND CARBON 
A. THE ROLE OF CARBON IN REAL TIME AND GLOBAL WARMING  
Since the Industrial Revolution, emissions resulting from 
combusting fossil fuels used for mechanical and electrical energy have 
permeated the atmosphere.15 Atmospheric CO2 levels now are 
approximately 33% higher than in pre-industrial times.16 
Temperature changes move in direct relation to atmospheric 
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations.17 GHGs include carbon dioxide 
(CO2), methane (CH4), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), and perfluorocarbons (PFCs).18 Notably, the most prevalent 
GHG is water vapor. It, alone, is the major unregulated GHG, because 
it is assumed to be too pervasive a phenomenon to be regulated.19 
The regulated GHGs in Table 1 are displayed in descending order of 
their impacts on the environment, which is a function of their 
                                                          
 15. See Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Global Warming Basics, 
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-basics (last visited Feb. 21, 
2009) (using a variety of articles to discuss the basics of climate change). 
 16. Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Global Warming, 31 ENVTL. L. REP.: NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10253, 10254 (2001) (“Compared with pre-industrial levels, CO2 
concentration in the atmosphere has risen from about 270 to 280 parts 
per million by volume (ppmv) to over 360 ppmv in 1999, N20[, or nitrous 
oxide,] has risen from 270 ppmv to over 310 ppmv, and CH4[, or 
methane,] concentration has increased from 700 parts per billion by 
volume to over 1,700 ppbv.”). 
 17. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 4-5 (2001) 
[hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 2001], http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-
changes-2001/synthesis-spm/synthesis-spm-en.pdf (identifying causal 
link between GHGs and climate change). 
 18. In 2000 anthropogenic activities emitted an estimated 347 TgN of 
methane and 33 TgN of NOx into the atmosphere per year. WORKING 
GROUP I [WGI], INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 248-66 (2001), 
http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/?src=/CLIMATE/IPCC
_TAR/wg1/006.htm. 
 19. Thomas R. Karl & Kevin E. Trenberth, Modern Global Climate 
Change, 302 SCI. 1719, 1719 (2003). 
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quantity released, their heat radiation properties, and their residence 
time in the atmosphere. 
Table 1: Key Regulated Greenhouse Gases 
 
GHG Global 
Warming 
Relative  
Impact 
[CO2=1] 
Residency 
Time 
[years] 
Amount 
of U.S. 
Total 
GHG 
Release 
[%]20 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 1 100 85 
Methane (CH4) 21 12 11 
Nitrous Oxides (NOx) 310 120 2 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons 
(HFCs) 
140-
11700 
Varies < 1 
Chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) 
6500 Varies < 1 
Hexafluoride (SF6) 23,900 Varies < 1 
 
 
Despite earlier debate within the scientific community about 
whether climate change was natural or human-induced, the Fourth 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) in 
2007 concluded that the evidence of human-made global warming is 
“unequivocal.”21 CO2 is the human-caused emission of most concern. 
CO2 is the main byproduct of fossil fuel combustion, and therefore 
results from any energy production that uses oil, coal, natural gas, or 
other solid waste fuels.22 Ninety-eight percent of anthropogenic CO2 
emissions are from combustion of fossil fuels, and 84% of energy-
related U.S. GHG emissions are attributed to CO2.23 All forecasts by 
                                                          
 20. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2004, at ES-3 (2006), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/OAR/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/RA
MR6MBSC3/$File/06_Complete_Report.pdfWGI Full Report. 
 21. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 30 (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. 
 22. For a complete discussion of global warming, see JOHN HOUGHTON, 
GLOBAL WARMING: THE COMPLETE BRIEFING (3d ed. 2004). 
 23. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, EMISSIONS OF 
GREENHOUSE GASES REPORT (2008) [hereinafter EMISSIONS REPORT], 
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the U.S. Department of Energy, the International Energy Agency, and 
independent forecasters agree that GHG emissions will increase 
exponentially, not decrease, during the foreseeable future.24 Global 
energy-related CO2 emissions are rising at the rate of approximately 
1.7% per year.25 
Some leading climate scientists conclude that we are reaching a 
tipping point, where climate impacts will cause irreversible damage.26 
A recent assessment is that we need to limit the increase in the 
“global average surface temperature to no more than 2 to 2.5°C above 
its 1750 value of approximately 15°C” to avoid the most catastrophic 
effects of global warming.27 This will require a sharp reduction of 
emissions over the next generation and annual GHG emission 
reduction to “near zero by 2100.”28 A zero-carbon emission economy 
is a radical transition. Global carbon concentrations in the 
atmosphere are now accelerating at four times the rate they did a 
decade ago, in the 1990s.29 
This will only be possible if we can “demonstrate that a modern 
society can function without reliance on technologies that release 
carbon dioxide . . . .”30 NASA scientist James Hansen forecast this to 
exceed the tipping point once the atmosphere exceeds 400 to 425 
                                                          
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/carbon.html. 
 24. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2008 (2008) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK], 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/emissions.html. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 217 (“If humanity wishes to 
preserve a planet similar to that on which civilization developed . . . 
paleoclimate evidence and ongoing climate change suggest that CO2 will 
need to be reduced from its current 385 ppm to at most 350 ppm. . . . If 
the present overshoot of this target CO2 is not brief, there is a possibility 
of seeding irreversible catastrophic effects.”); Bill McKibben, Civilization’s 
Last Chance: The Planet is Nearing a Tipping Point on Climate Change, and 
It Gets Much Worse Fast, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2008, available 
at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-mckibben11-
2008may11,0,7434369.story. 
 27. Michael C. MacCracken, Prospects for Future Climate Change and 
the Reasons for Early Action, EM, June 2008, at 40; see also, TONY BLAIR, 
THE CLIMATE GROUP, BREAKING THE CLIMATE DEADLOCK: A GLOBAL DEAL FOR 
OUR LOW-CARBON FUTURE 9 (2008), 
http://tonyblairoffice.org/BreakingTheClimateDeadlock.pdf. 
 28. MacCracken, supra note 27, at 40. 
 29. Global Carbon Concentrations Accelerating at Almost Four Times 
Growth Rate of 1990s, 39 ENV’T REP. 1967 (2008). 
 30. MacCracken, supra note 27, at 40. 
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parts per million (“ppm”) of CO2.31 Since the beginning of the 
Industrial Revolution, CO2 has increased by about a third to 387 
ppm. At 450 ppm, Hansen says there will be no more ice left on the 
planet.32 
A top official with the IPCC has indicated that developed nations 
will need to slash CO2 emissions by 80 to 95%—almost entirely—by 
2050 to hold GHGs to 450 ppm in the atmosphere.33 Hansen notes 
that waiting even until 2018 to stop the growth of greenhouse gas 
emissions, virtually eliminates the chances of avoiding the 
catastrophic effects of warming.34 According to Dr. John Holdren, 
director of the Woods Hole Laboratory, even if U.S. greenhouse 
emissions plateau in six years in 2015, the world already has reduced 
our chances by 50% to avoid climate catastrophes.35 However, neither 
the more than a dozen U.S. states that are starting to regulate 
carbon, nor federal U.S. action, nor forecasts by international energy 
agencies offer any assurance of a plateau in carbon emissions by 
2015. 
B. THE POWER SECTOR AND CARBON GENERATION 
Fossil fuel is everywhere: as a virtually exclusive transportation 
fuel, used for home and business heat, dominating the production of 
electric power. However, the focus of all regulators is on the electric 
power sector. This occurs for two primary reasons. First, there is a 
manageable number of electric power generators to regulate, while 
there are thousands of times more fossil-fuel-fired vehicles operated 
by billions of individuals. For example, in the United States there are 
fewer than 5000 centrally dispatched power generation machines, 
compared with more than 100 million automobiles. Second, 
regulators have always shied away from applying environmental 
regulations to individual voters, as opposed to larger sources. This is 
again evident in early carbon regulation: the emphasis is on electric 
power generation. 
Ninety-eight percent of anthropogenic CO2 emissions are from 
                                                          
 31. Dean Scott, NASA Scientist Recalls 1988 Testimony By Seeking 
Phaseout of Coal-Fired Plants, 39 ENV’T REP. 1273 (2008). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Rick Mitchell, IPCC Official Says Industrialized Nations Must Cut 
Up to 95 Percent, 39 ENV’T REP. 1917 (2008). 
 34. Robin Chase, Get Real on Global Warming Goals, B. GLOBE, Apr. 
22, 2008, at A15. 
 35. Id. 
FERREY S.  When 1 + 1 No Longer Equals 2: The New Math of Legal "Additionality"  
Controlling World and U.S. Global Warming Regulation.  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
2009;10(2): 591-670. 
2009] WHEN 1 + 1 NO LONGER EQUALS 2 599 
combustion of fossil fuels.36 Most countries are using fossil fuels, not 
renewable power resources, to satisfy the exponential increase in 
demand. Despite the emphasis in the United States on reducing GHG 
emissions, electric power demand continues to increase.37 Fossil fuel 
combustion results in 64% of the total atmospheric CO2, and this 
amount has increased significantly since 1990.38 Burning gaseous, 
liquid, and solid fossil fuels to create electric power releases copious 
quantities of CO2 into the environment.39 Success of GHG regulation 
in the United States, and internationally, will be linked to the level of 
emissions of the electric utility industry. 
None of the countries with the largest coal reserves—United 
States, China, India, Indonesia—has a carbon policy to regulate the 
release of CO2 from the deployment of such coal reserves.40 China 
and India are building almost a new coal plant each week.41 China 
and India harbor around one-quarter of the world’s coal reserves, and 
are deploying them rapidly to fire electric power plants.42 India has 
targeted 100,000 megawatts (“MW”) in new capacity over the next ten 
years.43 China is currently installing 1000 MW of coal power 
generation each week and predictions are that by the year “2030, 
coal-fired power in India and China will add 3000 million extra tons of 
                                                          
 36. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, EMISSION OF 
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 1998 (1999) [hereinafter EIA, 
GASES 1998], 
ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/oiaf/1605/cdrom/pdf/ggrpt/057398.pdf. 
 37. See, e.g., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2004 
(2004), available at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2004/weo2004.pdf. 
 38. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 4, at 2–3 (2007), available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/summary/pdf/0573(2005)es.pd
f; Frequently Asked Global Change Questions, 
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/faq.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2008). 
 39. The amount of carbon released per unit of usable energy 
decreased each time as human populations moved from wood to coal as 
the dominant CO2-releasing fuel in the late 19th century, and again 
moved from coal to oil in the mid 20th century, and will move toward 
natural gas in the future. See FERREY, supra note *, at § 2.1. 
 40. See List of Annex I Parties, supra note 2. 
 41. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Europe Turns Back to Coal, Raising Climate 
Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1. 
 42. 2007 Survey of Energy Resources, World Energy Council 2007, 
Coal (2007), China at 26, India at 30, available at 
http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/coal_country_notes.pdf. 
 43. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, INDIA COUNTRY 
ANALYSIS BRIEF (2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/India/pdf.pdf. 
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CO2 to the atmosphere every year.”44 Each year China adds forty 
times more new coal capacity than new wind power capacity.45  
Additional deployment of coal is still at the forefront of new 
electric generation. Indonesia has a program to build by 2010 a 
significant number of new coal-fired power plants without 
sequestration of carbon emissions.46 In spring 2008, Indonesia 
invited banks to participate in financing five new coal-fired power 
plants worth more than $2 billion, representing the first part of an 
effort by the world’s fourth most populous country to almost double 
its generating capacity utilizing coal-fired generation.47 Indonesia has 
large amount of renewable resources, but a decade ago backed away 
from a program designed to feature them in future development.48 
At current rates of world energy development, energy-related CO2 
emissions in 2050 would be 255% of their current levels in developing 
countries.49 Unprecedented deployment of renewable energy 
generation alternatives will be required to alter this trend.50 The 
technology exists to accomplish a reversal of use of fossil fuels for 
power generation. The amount of solar radiation striking the Earth is 
about 10,000 times the Earth’s commercial energy use;51 converting 
one to two percent of the appropriate land area of the Earth to utilize 
solar energy could satisfy much of the Earth’s electricity requirements 
                                                          
 44. Ray Purdy, The Legal Implications of Carbon Capture and Storage 
Under the Sea, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Fall 2006, at 23. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Banks Invited to Bid for Financing 5 Indonesian Power Projects, 
ASIA PULSE PTY. LTD., Mar. 19, 2008. 
 47. Id. 
 48. In the mid 1990s, the author, as a consultant for the World Bank 
and the government of Indonesia, helped design a program for Indonesia 
that would have utilized renewable energy sources for up to one-third of 
future power development, but was never followed. See generally FERREY 
& CABRAAL, supra note *. 
 49. William C. Ramsay, IEA Deputy Executive Dir., Address at the 5th 
IEEJ Energy Seminar: Energy Technology Perspectives: Scenarios and 
Strategies to 2050 (July 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/speech/2006/ramsay/etp_ieej.pdf. 
 50. Neal J. Cabral, The Role of Renewable Portfolio Standards in the 
Context of a National Carbon Cap-and-Trade Program, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. 
& POL’Y, Fall 2007, at 13, 14–15. 
 51. Interview by Martin Smith with Jeffrey Sachs, Director, The Earth 
Institute, Professor of Health Policy and Management, Columbia 
University, 
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/africa705/history/sachs.html
. 
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when solar radiation is available. 
In fact, no nation on Earth uses more energy than the energy 
content contained in the sunlight that strikes its existing buildings 
every day.52 The solar energy that falls on roads in the United States 
each year contains roughly as much energy content as all the fossil 
fuel consumed in the world during that same year.53 Storing that 
energy efficiently is another matter.54 Tomorrow, the earth will have 
exactly as much solar energy as it has today, regardless of how much 
solar energy is used and consumed each day.55 
Despite the emergence of, and attention to, renewable energy 
sources, forecasters do not see the international mix of power 
generation sources changing appreciably over the next several 
decades.56 The percentage of fossil fuels in the mix—and thus the 
potential sources of GHGs in the power sector—is forecast to remain 
relatively constant. The International Energy Agency in Paris predicts 
that by 2030, world demand for energy will grow by 59% and fossil 
fuel sources will still supply 82% of the total, with non-carbon 
renewable energy sources supplying only 6%.57 Clearly GHGs in the 
twenty-first century are about power generation sources and 
means.58 
What follows examines the major U.S. programs to regulate 
carbon emissions, their allowance of offset credits and how they 
interface with renewable power. 
 
                                                          
 52. STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 
526 (4th ed. 2007). 
 53. Id. 
 54. For a discussion of electric energy storage options, see FERREY, 
supra note *, at § 2.20. 
 55. The sun has consumed the same amount of energy for the past 4 
to 5 billion years, and will continue to do so for the next 4 to 5 billion 
years. FERREY, supra note *, at 526. 
 56. Clark Gelling, Electric Power Research Institute, presentation at 
Aegis Conference, July 25, 2007. 
 57. See, e.g., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2004 
(2004), available at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2004/weo2004.pdf. 
 58. For detailed coverage of the power industry law and regulation, 
see generally FERREY, supra note *. 
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III. THE EAST COAST 10-STATE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE 
GAS INITIATIVE 
A. THE REGULATORY SCHEME 
Many states have taken their own direct regulatory action.59 
RGGI is the first such regulatory effort in the United States and 
includes ten U.S. states. Beginning in April 2003, Governor George 
Pataki of New York initiated the effort by inviting neighboring states to 
participate in a regional cap-and-trade emissions program.60 On 
December 20, 2005, seven states—Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont—entered into 
an agreement to implement the RGGI.61 Since that time, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, and Rhode Island have agreed to sign the 
RGGI Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) (collectively all ten 
states, the “RGGI states”).62 The principle goal of the MOU is for RGGI 
states to: 
Commit to propose for legislative and/or regulatory approval a 
CO2 Budget Trading Program (the “Program”) aimed at stabilizing 
and then reducing CO2 emissions within the Signatory States, 
and implementing a regional CO2 emissions budget and allowance 
                                                          
 59. For example, prior to joining any formal agreement, 
Massachusetts enacted its own regulations to reduce CO2 emissions from 
1997–1999 by ten percent. 310 MASS. CODE REGS. § 7.29 (2007). 
 60. Q & A: Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
http://www.pewclimate.org/rggi/qanda (last visited Mar. 13, 2009). 
 61. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Memorandum of 
Understanding (Dec. 20, 2005) [hereinafter RGGI Memorandum of 
Understanding], available at 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf. 
 62. Massachusetts and Rhode Island were originally given the status 
of observing states. In January 2007 both agreed to formally join RGGI as 
signatory states. Maryland, a predominantly coal-powered electricity 
generating state in contrast to the other RGGI states, also subsequently 
joined RGGI in 2007. Press Release, Office of the Governor of Mass., 
Governor Patrick Signs Regional Pact to Reduce Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions (Jan. 18, 2007), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=pressreleases&agId=Agov3&prModName=
gov3pressrelease&prFile=reduce_greenhouse_gases011807.xml; Press 
Release, Office of the Lieutenant Governor of R.I., Lt. Gov. Roberts Calls 
for Rhode Island to Join Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Jan. 23, 
2007), available at http://www.ri.gov/press/view.php?id=3423; Press 
Release, Office of the Governor of Md., Governor Martin O’Malley Signs 
Greenhouse Gas Agreement, Climate Change Executive Order (Apr. 20, 
2007), available at 
http://www.gov.state.md.us/pressreleases/070420.html. 
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trading program that will regulate CO2 emissions from fossil fuel-
fired electricity generating units having a rated capacity equal to 
or greater than 25 megawatts.63 
The market-based design of the RGGI MOU is a cap-and-trade 
program. “Cap-and-trade systems operate by capping the amount of 
CO2 emissions allowed, distributing emissions allowances to sources, 
and requiring each covered source to have sufficient allowances to 
cover its emissions at the end of each compliance period.” Allowances 
can be traded among emission sources.  
The RGGI Staff Working Group (“SWG”) finalized the Draft Model 
Rule (“Model Rule”) in January of 2007. The Model Rule is a product 
of over two years of work by the SWG and it is the foundation upon 
which the RGGI states will base their individual regulatory rules. The 
Model Rule is used by each state as a starting point for obtaining 
regulatory or legislative approval of its cap-and-trade program, but all 
such authorization is accomplished at the individual state level.64 
RGGI started in January 2009. From that time, CO2 emissions 
from power plants in the region will be capped at current levels65 and 
the cap will remain in place until 2015. RGGI states have begun the 
process of incrementally reducing emissions, with the goal of 
achieving a 10% reduction by 2019.66 By 2020, the program is 
expected to reach an emissions reduction of approximately 35% from 
a business-as-usual unregulated carbon scenario.67 
All emissions must be verified by independent entities accredited 
by the state.68 Since each state will administer its own carbon 
allocation, allowances, and offset accounting, failure to comply with 
state requirements could result in the regulated entity’s credits being 
restrained or confiscated.69 The RGGI Model Rule indicates that when 
a regulated entity’s emissions exceed its CO2 allowance budget, the 
state can deduct from the entity’s compliance account, future 
                                                          
 63. RGGI Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 61, at 2. 
 64. Id. at 1. 
 65. The regional base annual CO2 emissions cap will be equal to 121 
million short tons. Id. at 2. 
 66. Press Release, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, States Reach 
Agreement on Proposed Rules for the Nation’s First Cap-and-Trade 
Program to Address Climate Change (Aug. 15, 2006), available at 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/model_rule_release_8_15_06.pdf. 
 67. Id. 
 68. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-10.5(a)(5)(iii). There are provisions that 
attempt to avoid conflict of interest situations between verifiers and 
owners of projects that might employ their services. Id. § XX-10.6(e)(3). 
 69. Id. § XX-6.5(b). 
FERREY S.  When 1 + 1 No Longer Equals 2: The New Math of Legal "Additionality"  
Controlling World and U.S. Global Warming Regulation.  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
2009;10(2): 591-670. 
604 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 10:2 
 
 
allowances (beyond the current control period) equal to three times 
the number of the entity’s excess emissions.70 If the regulated entity 
has insufficient CO2 allowances to cover three times that amount, it 
must immediately thereafter transfer sufficient allowances into its 
compliance account.71 
One significant aspect of the Model Rule is its requirement that 
each state reserve a minimum of 25% of that state’s allowances for 
“consumer benefit or strategic energy purpose[s].”72 This translates to 
auctioning these reserved allowances to whomever wants to purchase 
them for compliance or speculation and resale. Depending on the 
market for allowances, this could realize for states millions of dollars 
in an open-ended fund. Consumer benefits could include using the 
money to supplement consumer electricity bills or funding state-run 
energy efficiency programs, refunding amounts to consumers, or 
putting the money back into the state coffers. 
In general, however, electricity generators have a variety of 
options to comply with RGGI, including reducing emissions through 
efficiency measures, instituting newer technologies, and changing fuel 
sources. Generators that implement such measures can then sell any 
excess allowances or purchase additional allowances from other 
qualifying power producers. 
B. “ADDITIONALITY” AND CREATION OF OFFSETS 
Because the price of implementing carbon reduction is often 
high, RGGI also created an offsets program to offer power producers 
flexibility in meeting the cap limitations through creation or trading of 
additionally-created external market carbon credits. “Offsets” under 
RGGI are emissions reductions that come from sources other than 
fossil fuel-fired electricity generators that are subject to the emissions 
cap under RGGI.73 The offsets program awards offset allowances for 
approved offset projects that were realized on or after the date of the 
MOU.74 Power generators can use offset allowances to comply with 
some of their legal compliance requirements. 
No credits can be awarded for projects that are required by any 
                                                          
 70. Id. § XX-6.5(d)(1). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. § XX-5.3(a)-(b). 
 73. Offsets, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
http://rggi.org/offsets (last visited May 8, 2009). 
 74. RGGI Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 61, at 4. 
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“local, state or federal law, regulation, or administrative or judicial 
order.”75 These would not be additional to pre-existing legal 
requirements.76 Thus, retrofits, efficiency improvements, or emission 
reductions required by regulation or embodied in permits or consent 
decrees will not create salable offset credits. 
The number of allowances available from the RGGI states 
declines over time. Offsets can fill this potential shortfall of allowances 
because each offset acquired permits an additional ton of CO2 
emission. The Independent Power Producers of New York have 
indicated that generators could be left short of necessary allowances 
when open bidding at auction as most RGGI states allow, and under 
pre-existing power contracts may have no means to recover their 
carbon-related costs.77 New York has set aside 1.5 million credits to 
assist the generators operating under long-term contracts that do not 
consider carbon-related costs, but the generators say that this is less 
than half as many as needed.78 Creation of additional offsets will play 
an important role to fill any shortfall of allowances below the level of 
CO2 emissions. 
The initial offset projects that can be approved under the Offsets 
Program include: (1) landfill methane capture and combustion; (2) 
sulfur hexafluoride (SH6) capture and recycling; (3) afforestation 
(transition of land from a non-forested to forested state); (4) end-use 
efficiency for natural gas, propane, and heating oil; (5) methane 
capture from farming operations; and (6) projects to reduce fugitive 
methane emissions from natural gas transmission and distribution.79 
As expressed in the RGGI MOU, RGGI states have agreed to continue 
to cooperate on the development of additional offsets projects.80 
However, the eligible list of offset projects omits projects that 
involve the installation of renewable energy resources. At first blush, 
this would seem to be counterintuitive and at cross-purposes with 
other policies. About half of the fifty states award renewable energy 
credits for the installation of eligible81 renewable energy electric 
                                                          
 75. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-10.3(d)(1). 
 76. See supra Part I (discussing “additionality”). 
 77. Lisa Wood, New York Approves Rules for RGGI Carbon Trading; 
Independents Object, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Aug. 18, 2008, at 4. 
 78. Id. at 6. 
 79. RGGI Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 61, at 4. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See infra Part V.C. There is significant variation in what is an 
eligible renewable energy technology in each of the states. While certain 
wind and solar technologies seem to qualify everywhere, the eligibility of 
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generation facilities.82 In addition, sixteen states also authorize a tax 
on retail utility bills that creates a renewable energy trust fund used 
to make grants, loans, or otherwise provide incentives to renewable 
energy projects.83 In addition, 76% of all states allow smaller 
renewable energy projects to enjoy the net metering of their electricity 
when sold back to the host electricity supplier, thus effectively 
allowing these smaller projects to sell wholesale power at much higher 
retail rates.84 
However, these other renewable credits and incentives are used 
to justify the RGGI program to disallow credit for any project that has 
an electric generation component, unless the project sponsor 
transfers legal rights in the renewable credits to the regulatory 
agency.85 
On the whole, renewable resources are not eligible to create 
RGGI offset allowances. The RGGI Model Rule will not issue offset 
allowances to any offset project that receives funding or other 
incentives from state renewable energy trust funds86 or any credits or 
allowances that would be earned from any other mandatory or 
voluntary GHG programs.87 These measures are restrictive 
considering that renewable energy credits in many states are expected 
to trade at higher prices than RGGI offsets or credits.88 Therefore, the 
                                                          
various biomass, landfill gas, hydroelectric and other facilities varies 
significantly. See Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, 
and States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507, 647–48 tbl.4 
(2004). 
 82. For a detailed discussion of these state renewable energy 
programs, see Ferrey, supra note 81, at 529–32. See also Steven Ferrey, 
Renewable Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State 
Level, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2006, at 52. 
 83. See Ferrey, supra note 81, at 523–29. 
 84. For a discussion of net metering and its legal and policy 
implications, see Steven Ferrey, Nothing But Net: Renewable Energy and 
the Environment: MidAmerican Legal Fictions, and Supremacy Doctrine, 14 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2003); see also Steven Ferrey, Net Zero: 
Distributed Generation and FERC’s MidAmerican Decision, ELECTRICITY J., 
Oct. 2004, at 33. 
 85. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-10.3(d)(2). 
 86. Id. § XX-10.3(d)(3). 
 87. Id. § XX-10.3(d)(4). 
 88. For discussion of recent REC trading prices, see Ryan Wiser, et 
al., The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United 
States, ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 8. There is little reliable trading data 
yet in the United States regarding trading of carbon offsets or allowances. 
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RGGI scheme stands conspicuously apart from other carbon 
schemes89 and even from the renewable energy incentive programs 
that the RGGI states have otherwise adopted and implemented.90 
In sum, the RGGI scheme does not contemplate that renewable 
energy projects may create offsets for program compliance, with one 
exception: destruction of methane in a landfill gas project is eligible 
for RECs despite creating CO2 while destroying methane.91 Despite 
controversy over this point, it was believed by the state environmental 
officials administering RGGI that renewable energy projects do not 
themselves diminish CO2 emissions. However, methane destruction 
destroys methane by converting it to CO2, in addition to producing 
power. As shown in table 1 above, methane is more than twenty times 
more damaging in global warming than is CO2 emitted to the 
atmosphere molecule for molecule, so this conversion is deemed to 
have independent significance.92 By comparison, renewable energy 
projects create neither CO2 nor methane, yet are not eligible to create 
RGGI offsets. 
In addition, the RGGI Model Rule implies, albeit with some 
ambiguity, that energy conservation projects can qualify to generate 
offsets.93For example, fossil-fuel-burning efficiency improvements to 
the combustion device itself—the furnace or boiler—may qualify as an 
offset project. Or, albeit with less certainty, the installation of building 
thermal efficiency measures—which saves CO2 emissions by making 
the building retain heat more efficiently, and thus requires less 
operation of existing fossil-fuel-burning equipment even if the 
equipment itself is not made more efficient—could qualify as an offset 
project. Finally, with two degrees of separation, a production of 
energy-efficient, electricity-using appliances—which would help 
reduce CO2 emissions on the customer’s side of the meter—may even 
be a valid offset project under the Model Rule. 
To ensure that the majority of the emissions reductions occur 
within the regulated power production sector, the RGGI MOU places 
limits on the use of offsets and the issuance of additional offsets to 
moderate offset price impacts.94 In particular, RGGI initially allows 
                                                          
However, anecdotal evidence is that RGGI allowances traded even before 
they were available at more than $8 per ton, above projected prices. 
 89. See infra Part V (discussing other regulatory regimes). 
 90. See infra Part V. 
 91. RGGI MODEL RULE §§ XX-10.3(a)(1)(i), XX-10.5(a). 
 92. See supra Part II.A tbl.1. 
 93. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-10.5(d). 
 94. RGGI Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 61, at 6. 
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offset projects anywhere in the United States if the average price of an 
emission allowance remains below $7 per ton.95 In each compliance 
period, each generator will be allowed to cover up to 3.3% of their 
emissions using offset allowances, which is roughly equal to half of 
that generator’s emissions reduction obligation.96  
If allowance prices rise above $10 per ton,97 RGGI will allow 
sources to cover up to 10% of their emissions with offsets, and will 
allow offset projects outside the United States as well as allowances 
from the E.U. Emissions Trading Scheme (“EU-ETS”) and the Kyoto 
Protocol’s CDM.98 This would allow the full RGGI reduction of 10% of 
allowance emissions by 2018 to come from purchasing offsets on the 
market, rather than making actual reductions at the generation 
facility. If allowance prices rise above $10 per ton, then the 
compliance period will be extended by one year, for a maximum 
compliance period of 4 years.99 This mechanism will “give sources 
more time to reduce their emissions and may allow allowance prices 
to fall.”100 
The purpose of these price-denominated “circuit breaker” 
provisions is to effectively suspend the rules of the RGGI program 
during those periods when the market-based cap-and-trade system 
results in trading allowances at politically controversial prices. In 
other words, when the market works to reflect short supply of 
allowances, the definition of what can be counted and traded, both in 
geographic and percentage dimensions, is liberalized to allow 
regulated entities greater flexibility to document compliance. The 
decision to include EU-ETS and Kyoto CDM project credits as eligible 
currency is curious. Since EU-ETS credits are given away without 
charge by E.U. industries as part of the political process,101 this 
effectively works as an income and welfare shift from U.S. power-
generation owners to E.U. industries. 
                                                          
 95. Id. at 3 (using dollar value in 2005). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Q & A: Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (2007), http://www.pewclimate.org/rggi/qanda. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Stephen Gardner, EU Parliament, Council Making Progress on Post-
2012 Emissions Trading Scheme, 39 ENV’T REP. 1417, 1418 (2008); 
Revised EU GHG-Trading Program May Shape U.S. Proposals, CARBON 
CONTROL NEWS, July 14, 2008, http://www.carboncontrol news.com. 
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Offsets must be real, verifiable, permanent, enforceable, and 
“additional.” 102 Offsets credits have a lifetime of ten years, with the 
possibility of one renewal;103 afforestation project credits have a 
twenty-year lifetime, with a possible renewal up to sixty years.104 
However, RGGI offsets do not provide any additionality relative to any 
net carbon-emitting power plant performance. 
Unlike with allowances, there is no limit on the number of offsets 
that can be created.105 The only limit is on the maximum 3.3% 
number of offsets that a regulated large power producer can utilize for 
purposes of compliance, which will rise to a maximum 20% under 
certain allowance cost scenarios.106 This small percentage actually is 
larger in impact than it may appear. Since RGGI holds the line on 
CO2 emissions until 2015, and thereafter accomplishes a progressive 
10% cumulative carbon reduction by 2018, even this 3.3% annual 
offset compliance share is equivalent to almost 50% of reductions 
expected to be necessary for compliance through 2018.107 
Ways exists for fossil-fueled power projects in RGGI states to 
avoid regulation of their carbon emissions. Exceptions exist for units 
greater than 25 MW that burn 50% or less fossil fuels.108 States also 
have an option to exempt a self-generation unit on a customer’s site 
that sells less than 10% of its output to the grid.109 States also could 
choose to allocate carbon allowances to load-serving entities (“LSEs”) 
rather than to generators of power.110 
California is critical because it will regulate all sectors of its 
economy, not just large power projects, and will regulate all GHGs, 
not just CO2. California is three years behind the ten RGGI states, but 
will have a substantial impact and is making distinct choices on 
offsets and “additionality.” Together, these 11 states (RGGI and 
                                                          
 102. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-10.1. This requirement also exists in the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
 103. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-10.3(e)(1). 
 104. Id. § XX-10.3(e)(2). 
 105. Christopher Sherry, Landfill Gas Offset Projects in the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, (Jan. 13, 2009), 
http://www.epa.gov/landfill/conf/12th/sherry.pdf. 
 106. RGGI Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 61, at 5–6. 
 107. Christopher Sherry, Chair, RGGI Staff Working Group, N.J. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Prot., Address at the RGGI Regional Stakeholder Meeting: RGGI 
Offsets Update (May 2, 2006), available at 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/sherry_rggi_offsets_5_2_06_rev.ppt. 
 108. RGGI Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 61. 
 109. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-1.4(b)(1). 
 110. Id. § XX-5.3. 
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California) create the template for any future national carbon 
regulation at the national level, as is being pursued by the Obama 
administration. However, both are struggling with “additionality.” 
California is discussed next. 
IV. CARBON REGULATION IN CALIFORNIA 
A. THE PROGRAM STRUCTURE 
California is the twelfth largest GHG producer in the world.111 
Imported electricity contributes more GHG emissions than electricity 
produced in California, even though 78% of electricity consumed in 
California is produced in-state.112 California has taken the most 
aggressive approach of all the states to curb emissions, as it will 
regulate all sectors of its economy, not just large power projects, and 
will regulate all GHGs, not just CO2. Its landmark legislation 
establishes a comprehensive program of regulatory and market 
mechanisms with the goal of achieving cost-effective and quantifiable 
GHG emissions reductions. 
Pursuant to the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 
(commonly referred to as Assembly Bill 32 or AB 32), the state is 
required to reduce its aggregate GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 
2020.113 This equates to an eventual estimated 25%-29% reduction 
from business-as-usual levels.114 AB 32 charges the California Air 
Resources Board (“CARB”) with the responsibility for developing and 
implementing a plan to meet this challenging emissions-reduction 
goal and for carrying out the regulatory development and enforcement 
of the statewide emissions limit and mandatory reporting 
requirements.115 In addition, AB 32 charged CARB with the 
                                                          
 111. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N & CAL. PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, PROPOSED 
FINAL OPINION SUMMARY ON GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATORY STRATEGIES 2 
(2008), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC-100-2008-
004/CEC-100-2008-004.PDF. 
 112. Id. at 2–3 fig. 1. The percentage of imported electricity GHGs 
compared to in-state electricity has ranged from 39 to 57% recently. Id. at 
3. 
 113. Assemb. B. 32, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 
488 (West) (Cal. 2006) (discussing the reduction of emissions to 1990 
levels at what is codified as CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38550 (West 2007)). 
 114. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N & CAL. PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, supra note 
111, at 1; M.J. Bradley & Associates, California Legislature Passes Global 
Warming Solutions Act, CLIMATE CHANGE BRIEFING, Sept. 2006, at 1. 
 115. Assemb. B. 32 (summarizing CARB’s role in LEGISLATIVE 
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responsibility of establishing by January 1, 2008 a statewide GHG 
emissions cap, based on 1990 emissions levels, to be achieved by 
2020.116 AB 32 further required CARB to do the following: 
• Adopt a plan by January 1, 2009 for achieving emissions 
reductions from significant GHG sources via regulations, 
market mechanisms, and other actions. 
• Adopt rules and regulations by January 1, 2011 to 
achieve the maximum technologically feasible and cost-
effective GHG reductions, including provisions for using 
both market mechanisms and alternative compliance 
mechanisms. 
• Evaluate several factors—prior to imposing mandates or 
implementing market mechanisms—including but not 
limited to impacts on California’s economy, the 
environment, and public health; equity between 
regulated entities; electricity reliability; conformance with 
other environmental laws; and whether the rules will 
disproportionately impact low-income communities.117 
AB 32 specifically recognizes that a market-based system can be 
used in conjunction with regulatory and other strategies to meet 
California’s economy-wide goal of reducing emissions.118 To assist 
CARB in fulfilling its charge, the state created the Market Advisory 
Committee (“MAC”) to advise CARB on the development of a statewide 
plan to reduce GHG emissions.119 MAC is comprised of national and 
international experts in environmental policy, regulatory affairs, 
economics, and energy technologies.120 MAC’s primary objective was 
to design a mandatory cap-and-trade program to achieve cost-effective 
emissions cuts across all economic sectors.121 MAC employed a 
                                                          
COUNSEL’S DIGEST). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., AB 32 FACT SHEET–CALIFORNIA GLOBAL 
WARMING SOLUTIONS ACT OF 2006, 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/ab32factsheet.pdf. 
 118. See Assemb. B. 32 (summarizing AB 32 regulatory means in 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S DIGEST). 
 119. MKT. ADVISORY COMM., CAL. AIR RES. BD., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
DESIGNING A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM FOR CALIFORNIA 4 
(2007), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/ARB-1000-2007-
007/ARB-1000-2007-007.PDF. 
 120. Press Release, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Expert Advisor Releases 
Final Cap-and-Trade Report: Recommendations Intended to Complement 
California’s Ongoing Efforts to Reduce Emissions (June 29, 2007), 
http://www.calepa.ca.gov/PressRoom/Releases/2007/PR12-062907.pdf. 
 121. MKT. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 119, at iii. 
FERREY S.  When 1 + 1 No Longer Equals 2: The New Math of Legal "Additionality"  
Controlling World and U.S. Global Warming Regulation.  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
2009;10(2): 591-670. 
612 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 10:2 
 
 
systems approach and examined how a cap-and-trade program might 
interact with other measures such as regulations, performance-based 
standards, price subsidies, and tax credits.122 In its Final Report, 
issued in 2007, MAC concluded that a cap-and-trade program is fully 
compatible with other regulatory programs being introduced in the 
state and that such a market-based system could contribute 
significantly to meeting the emissions reduction target in AB 32.123 
MAC’s Final Report includes several key recommendations. The 
California cap-and-trade program should eventually incorporate all 
major GHG-emitting sectors in the state.124 In incorporating these 
sectors, the greatest attention should be given to the electricity, 
industry, buildings, and transportation sectors as the main 
contributors of emissions.125 The program’s scope, however, should 
be expanded over time so that it covers as many sectors, sources, and 
gases as possible to enable the state to meet its overall emissions 
reduction goal.126 To that end, MAC recommends that CARB adopt 
mandatory reporting requirements for all sources likely to be subject 
to a GHG emissions cap.127 
The cap-and-trade program should use a combined approach 
with regard to the distribution of allowances. MAC recommends an 
initial scheme of freely allocating some share of allowances while 
auctioning the other share of allowances.128 The percentage of 
allowances auctioned off should increase over time.129 MAC 
encourages the state to retain flexibility to freely allocate some of the 
allowances in a manner that stabilizes the price impacts and manages 
competitiveness among California power producers.130 MAC states 
that free allocation of allowances should be determined by 
environmental performance standards and the auction should be 
designed to promote voluntary early reductions.131 
Because the quantity of California’s imported electricity 
generated from coal is significant, California’s cap-and-trade program 
                                                          
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at iv. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 79. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 80. 
 129. Press Release, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 120. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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should take a “first-seller approach” to capping emissions associated 
with electricity.132 Under this approach, the entity that first sells 
electricity within the state must meet the compliance obligation 
established under the cap-and-trade scheme.133 For power generated 
in California, the owner or operator of the in-state power plant is 
considered the first seller and would be required to meet the 
emissions cap.134 For imported power, the first seller is typically an 
investor-owned or municipal utility or wholesale power marketer that 
sells electricity to a load-serving entity or large end-user. The out-of-
state entity under this approach would also be required to meet the 
emissions cap.135 
This MAC recommendation represents a significant departure 
from the original scheme. Originally, AB 32 regulated all LSEs (“load 
serving entity”), or retailers of power.136 Legally, all of these LSEs are 
located in-state or at least doing business in-state, and regulation is 
imposed at the retail level on all sellers in state of power to 
consumers. It is clear that state regulatory agencies have 
jurisdictional authority over retail power markets within their 
state.137 
The California carbon scheme covers all LSEs, including 
municipal LSEs.138 Electric generators are required to meet a CO2 
emissions level no greater than that achievable by a combined-cycle 
gas-fired generator.139 Combined-cycle generators utilize combustion 
                                                          
 132. MKT. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 119, at iv. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Assemb. B. 32 (discussing LSE reporting requirements at 
what is codified as CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38530 (West 2007)). 
 137. See Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,, 461 U.S. 
375, 377 (1983) (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1977)). 
 138. See Assemb. B. 32 (discussing municipal LSEs at what is codified 
as CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38530 (West 2007)). California is home to the 
largest municipal utility in the nation, the Los Angeles Department of 
Water and Power (LADWP), serving a multi-million person consumer base. 
LADWP is among the most dependent California LSEs on both power 
imports from out of state, and coal-fired high-GHG power. See Seth 
Hilton, The Impact of California’s Global Warming Legislation on the Electric 
Utility Industry, ELECTRICITY J, Nov. 2006, at 10, 13 (Nov. 2006). 
 139. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(d)(1) (2009). This legislation 
targets only electric generation. Sections 8340-8341 govern all new long-
term energy commitments and establish a “greenhouse gas emissions 
performance standard.” § 8341(d)(1). This is specific to the electric power 
role in meeting AB 32 goals. The GHG emissions standard creates a 
specific level of permissible emissions and prohibits new construction, 
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through two distinct combustion cycles, thus using more of the 
chemical energy in the fuel, and can achieve at least 50% greater 
efficiency than just a single cycle.140 Natural gas is the least carbon 
emitting of the fossil fuels. This translates that any new contracts for 
a term of five years or more for the procurement of baseload 
generation must comply with a performance standard of emitting no 
more than 1100 pounds of CO2 per MWh.141 “Baseload generation” is 
“designed and intended to provide electricity at an annualized plant 
capacity factor of at least 60 [%].”142 
Roughly one-half of California’s electric sector GHG emissions 
results from electric power imported from out of state generated 
predominately from coal-fired power plants.143 The impact of 
California’s new emissions limitations will significantly restrict the 
attractiveness of coal-fired generation for California. While California 
has little in-state coal generation, various California LSEs, 
particularly the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, import 
significant coal-fired power from various other states.144 This 
                                                          
new long-term power contracts, and any major plant investment that will 
not meet the performance standard. See § 8341. This prohibits load-
serving entities from entering long-term power contracts with out-of-state 
producers who do not meet California’s stringent new emissions standard. 
See § 8341(a). California’s Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”) has set the 
GHG emissions performance standard at the equivalent of the emissions 
from a combined-cycle natural gas plant. § 8341(d)(1). 
 140. See generally FERREY, supra note *, at chapter 2. 
 141. See § 8341; Hilton, supra note 138, at 14. This is a level that 
conventional coal-fired electric generation will not be able to meet, 
generating about 1,770 pounds of CO2 per MWh. See Hilton, supra note 
138, at 14. 
 142. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8340(a) (2009). 
 143. Re Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into 
Procurement Policies Rulemaking Proceeding 06-04-009, Decision 07-09-
017, 2007 WL 2579525, *2, *20 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Sept. 6, 2007). 
Three-quarters of California’s power imports come from the Southwest, 
and involves much coal-fired power, as opposed to the other quarter that 
is imported through the Northwest. AL ALVARADO & KAREN GRIFFIN, CAL. 
ENERGY COMM’N., REVISED METHODOLOGY TO ESTIMATE THE GENERATION 
RESOURCES MIX OF CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY IMPORTS: UPDATE TO THE MAY 
2006 STAFF PAPER 1 (Apr. 12, 2007), available at 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/CEC-700-2007-007/CEC-
700-2007-007.PDF. 
 144. See Hilton, The Impact of California’s Global Warming Legislation 
on the Electric Utility Industry, supra note 94, at 13. The three major 
investor-owned utilities import 3 to 15% of their total supply in the form 
of out-of-state coal-fired power. The Los Angeles DPW imports half of its 
power from these sources. Id. 
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legislation will have a significant impact on such LSEs. 
Given the importation of some high-carbon power sources, 
offsets become critical compliance elements for some of the California 
LSEs. The final details of offsets, “additionality,” and trading are still 
pending, but are in formation in California. They await 
implementation beginning in 2012. 
B. “ADDITIONALITY” AND OFFSETS 
Offsets would be permitted with unlimited banking and 
allowances would be allowed with no geographic limitations on their 
origination, and the program would bilaterally link to the Western 
Climate Initiative (“WCI”) regional plan.145 There would be no price 
trigger protections as in RGGI.146 This set of choices of California is 
fundamentally and legally distinct from its predecessor RGGI states. 
They differ on geographic limitation on offsets from outside the region. 
They differ on price triggers on acquisition of offsets. They differ in 
point of origin of offsets. 
While CARB must make the final determination, MAC has 
recommended starting with a limited number of allowed offset project 
types, such as those under RGGI, and has rejected any quantity 
limitations or geographic limitations on offsets.147 This is a much 
more expansive use of offsets than allowed under RGGI, both in 
numbers and geography.148 Therefore, total compliance in California 
could come through offsets, internal and external, rather than only 
in-state GHG emissions reductions. 
MAC had other recommendations that affect offsets in the still-
developing California architecture for the state’s 2012 program. MAC 
recommended that the cap-and-trade program should recognize 
offsets generated by sources within and outside of California’s 
borders.149 Therefore, it lacks some of the geographic restrictions of 
the RGGI scheme.150 California is exploring reforestation projects in 
Mexico to comply with the upcoming GHG cap-and-trade program.151 
California, in August 2008, executed a Memorandum of 
                                                          
 145. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N & CAL. PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, supra note 
111, at 13. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See MKT. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 119, at v. 
 148. See supra Part III.B. 
 149. Id. at v. 
 150. See supra Part III.B. 
 151. California Officials Eye Mexico Reforestation Projects for GHG 
Offsets, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, July 21, 2008. 
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Understanding to advance offset projects in six Mexican states to 
qualify as offsets in California or under a federal program.152 Some 
environmental groups believe and complain that this avoids the 
responsibility in AB 32 to reduce carbon emissions in the 
state.153MAC also recommended that California’s cap-and-trade 
program should be linked to similar policy initiatives in other 
jurisdictions to actively promote a “global greenhouse gas market.”154 
MAC recommends creating linkages to other mandatory GHG 
emissions reduction programs, especially those with strong 
compliance requirements and enforcement strategies that ensure 
long-lasting, positive climate-change impacts.155 
 Linkage also is at issue with regard to renewable energy 
programs, as well as geography of offsets. One area of contention in 
California is over whether renewable energy programs that satisfy 
REC’s requirements should also satisfy GHG mandates, which is not 
allowed by RGGI.156 Oddly, environmental groups which have 
traditionally supported renewable projects, charge this as unfair 
double-counting, while utilities support such credits.157 The 
environmental groups argue that separating the GHG attributes from 
the REC would “cripple the environmental benefits of the RPS 
[Renewable Portfolio Standard] program” and double-count GHG 
reductions.158 
Recently, the Public Utilities Commission proposed that RECs in 
California also include the attributes of avoided GHG emissions, thus 
opening up the possibility that it will later declare tradable RECs can 
be used for multiple compliance. 159 
                                                          
 152. Mexico, California Sign Agreement to Develop GHG-Offset Projects, 
CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Aug. 25, 2008. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Dispute Emerges Over GHG Benefits of Renewable Energy Credits, 
CARBON CONTROL NEWS, June 23, 2008. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Lyn Corum, Regulator Defines California RECs in Draft Decision, 
Moves Toward a Trading System, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., July 21, 2008, at 
12. 
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V. VOLUNTARY U.S. CARBON REGULATION 
A. VOLUNTARY CORPORATE REPORTING 
The United States has a handful of national voluntary programs. 
With the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress 
authorized a voluntary program to encourage the public to report 
achievements in reducing GHG emissions.160 Beginning in October of 
1994, the U.S. Department of Energy issued guidelines on the 
voluntary reporting of emissions reductions and carbon 
sequestration.161 This program, though, offers only an opportunity to 
report annual GHG emissions and record projects that reduce 
emissions or increase carbon sequestration; it does not provide a 
mandatory mechanism or monetary incentives to reduce carbon 
emissions.162 
The Chicago Climate Exchange (“CCX”) was among the first to 
create a voluntary, legally-binding multi-sector reduction and trade 
program that provides true monetary incentives.163 CCX is currently 
the single voluntary emissions trading system for all six GHGs and 
has almost 300 members from various sectors worldwide.164 For CCX 
members who choose to voluntarily participate in CCX’s binding 
commitment to meet annual GHG emission reduction goals, the 
program provides an opportunity to capitalize on the burgeoning 
carbon market. 
CCX issues Carbon Financial Instrument (“CFI”) contracts, each 
representing the equivalent of 100 metric tons of CO2, as the tradable 
commodity.165 The CFI contracts are either “Exchange Allowances” 
based on a member’s emission baseline and an overall reduction 
schedule or “Exchange Offsets” generated by certain types of offset 
projects.166 CCX members that reduce emissions below the target 
                                                          
 160. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, VOLUNTARY REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE 
GASES UNDER SECTION 1605(b) OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 1992 (1994), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/1605b.html. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Chi. Climate Exch., History, 
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/content.jsf?id=1 (last visited Feb. 18, 
2009). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Chi. Climate Exch., Overview, 
http://chicagoclimatex.com/content.jsf?id=821 (last visited Mar. 12, 
2009). 
 166. Id. 
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levels can sell or bank their surplus allowances.167 
Participation in the trading system requires that members agree 
to collect enough CFI contracts to meet the emission reduction 
requirement.168 To meet the requirement, members follow a schedule 
for reducing emissions that is carried out in two phases.169 Phase I 
(2003-2006) requires members to commit to reduce 1% below the 
1998-2001 baseline.170 This would result in a total reduction below 
the target baseline of 4% by 2006.171 Phase II (2007-2010) requires 
members to commit to an annual reduction schedule of an additional 
2%, resulting in an overall reduction commitment of 6% below 
baseline.172 
The CCX Offsets Program allows members and other entities that 
do not have significant GHG emissions to register offset projects.173 
CCX will issue traditional CFI contracts to Offset Providers or Offset 
Aggregators “for eligible projects on the basis of sequestration, 
destruction or reduction of GHG emissions.”174 An Offset Provider is 
defined as an owner of an offset project that registers and sells offsets 
on its own behalf.175 An Offset Aggregator is defined as an entity that 
serves as the “administrative representative, on behalf of offset project 
owners, of multiple offset-generating projects.”176 Offset Aggregators 
normally register and sell offset projects involving less than 10,000 
metric of CO2 equivalent per year.177 
CFI contracts are issued by CCX according to standardized rules 
for projects involving agricultural methane, landfill methane, 
                                                          
 167. Id. 
 168. Chi. Climate Exch., Emission Reduction Commitment, 
http://chicagoclimatex.com/content.jsf?id=72 (last visited Mar. 12, 
2009). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. The Phase I baseline is the average annual emissions from 
1998 to 2001. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. The Phase II baseline is the average annual emissions from 
1998 to 2001 or the single year of 2000. 
 173. Chi. Climate Exch., CCX Offsets Program, 
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/content.jsf?id=23 (last visited Feb. 11, 
2009) [hereinafter CCE, CCX Offsets]. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Chi. Climate Exch., Membership Categories, 
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/content.jsf?id=65 (last visited Mar. 12, 
2009). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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agricultural soil carbon, forestry, renewable energy, coal mine 
methane, and rangeland soil carbon.178 Other types of projects, such 
as energy efficiency and switching to lower carbon fossil fuel sources, 
are approved by CCX on a project-by-project basis.179 Note that with 
CFI, in contrast to RGGI, renewable energy projects qualify. However, 
this is not a mandatory carbon reduction program. 
B. UPCOMING REGIONAL U.S. CARBON EFFORTS 
Another voluntary program is the Western Climate Initiative 
(“WCI”). In a regional effort to address climate change, the governors 
of Oregon, Washington, California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, as 
well as the premiers of British Columbia, Manitoba, Quebec, and 
Ontario signed an agreement establishing the WCI. 180 In August 
2007, WCI announced the establishment of its regional, economy-
wide goal to reduce GHG emissions to 15% below 2005 levels by 
2020.181 To help reach this goal, WCI member states and provinces 
unveiled multi-sector market-based mechanisms, such as a load-
based cap-and-trade program, in August of 2008.182 The metrics for 
establishing this regional goal are based on (1) aggregate GHG 
emissions and the goals of WCI partners that had already established 
a 2020 goal;183 (2) emissions inventories from states or provinces, 
                                                          
 178. CCE, CCX Offsets, supra note 173. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Cathy Cash, Western Region Plan to Reduce GHG Emissions Has 
Energy Suppliers Waiting for Specifics, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Aug. 27, 2007, 
at 1. The original agreement was signed in February 2007 by Governors of 
Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington. In May 2007 
the state of Utah and the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and 
Manitoba joined WCI. The states of Kansas, Colorado, Wyoming and 
Nevada, the Canadian provinces of Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan 
and one Mexican state, Sonora, will participate in WCI as observers. See 
Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Regional Initiatives: Western Climate 
Initiative, 
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/regional_i
nitiatives.cfm?preview=1 (last visited Feb. 19, 2009); see also WCI: 
Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2009). 
 181. Press Release, W. Climate Initiative, Western Climate Initiative 
Statement of Regional Goal (Aug. 22, 2007), 
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/items/O104F13013
.pdf; Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, supra note 180. 
 182. Cash, supra note 180, at 1; Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, 
supra note 180. 
 183. Press Release, W. Climate Initiative, supra note 181. An important 
facet of the regional, economy-wide goal is its consistency with the pre-
FERREY S.  When 1 + 1 No Longer Equals 2: The New Math of Legal "Additionality"  
Controlling World and U.S. Global Warming Regulation.  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
2009;10(2): 591-670. 
620 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 10:2 
 
 
where available; (3) gross emissions estimates (across all sectors) for 
the six GHGs reported to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change;184 and (4) load-based emissions estimates for the electricity 
sector.185 
To achieve the new regional GHG emissions reduction goal, WCI 
is committed to limiting emissions that contribute to climate change 
from all sources of GHGs including but not limited to stationary 
sources, energy supply, residential, commercial, industrial, 
transportation, waste management, agriculture, and forestry.186 
Eventually WCI’s plan to curb emissions will focus on power plants 
and vehicles. Implementing the WCI plan will likely restrict the 
continued development of coal-fired power generation facilities 
because it will otherwise be difficult to meet the emission reduction 
goals. In developing its market approach, WCI members are engaging 
in discussions with leaders in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
and may consider some variety of incentives, standards, and 
regulations similar to the approach California has taken to combat 
climate change.187 
The western state WCI program will allow participating states to 
use CDM and Joint Implementation (“JI”) Kyoto credits as offsets.188 
CDM offset credits are created exclusively in developing countries 
under the Kyoto Protocol.189 Environmental groups have complained 
about the out-of-region geographic location of such offsets.190 Groups 
in WCI states are concerned that the GHG reduction plan might 
“crush the market for RECs.”191 The concern is that the area will not 
                                                          
existing emission goals of WCI members. See infra tbl.2, infra. 
 184. These six GHGs include: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), 
and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). 
 185. W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, STATEMENT OF REGIONAL GOAL 3 (2007), 
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/items/O104F13006
.pdf. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Western GHG Trading Plan Draws Concern over Offsets, Auctions, 
CARBON CONTROL NEWS, July 28, 2008, 
http://www.carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/show/western_ghg_t
rading_plan_draws_concerns_over_offsets_auctions/. 
 189. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, art. 12, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Critics Say Western GHG Plan Would Crush Renewable Trading 
Market, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Aug. 25, 2008, at 1, 
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be able to create more green power. They want the purchase of RECs 
to be tied into the reduction of the GHG cap that will be imposed. 
The problems inherent even in the early stages of a multi-state 
carbon program are evident in WCI. California is the lead state in 
forming WCI, but now complains that it is not treated fairly in the 
emerging WCI legal construct.192 California complained that the WCI 
will impose an inordinate burden on the California power sector 
starting in 2012, by excluding restriction on the transportation sector 
until 2015.193 Because California utilities rely on out-of-state 
electricity imports, California utilities argue that they require extra 
allocation of any allowances if they are to be the early focus.194 
Trading of carbon credits is already robust and growing quickly. 
Over 600 separate entities develop, market, or sell offsets in the 
United States in markets that have limited transparency.195 The CCX 
uses a registry to track offset trades, which can occur across 
international borders through web sites.196 
Shifting to the center of the nation, in November 2007, six 
participating midwestern states and Manitoba, a Canadian province, 
executed a regional greenhouse gas emission reduction strategy, 
called the Midwestern Greenhouse Reduction Accord.197 This 
included Minnesota, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Kansas, Ohio, 
South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Manitoba and Ontario.198 Three of 
these nine states (Indiana, Ohio, and South Dakota) are observing 
rather than participating initially.199 The group worked to develop a 
cap-and-trade carbon program in 2008 for implementation in 
                                                          
http://www.carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/show/critics_say_we
stern_ghg_plan_would_crush_renewable_trading_market/. 
 192. California Utilities Cry Foul Over Western State Cap-And-Trade 
Plan, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Aug. 25, 2008, 
http://www.carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/show/california_utili
ties_cry_foul_over_western_state_cap_and_trade_plan/. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. CARBON OFFSETS, supra note 8, at 7. Of these, 210 were original 
providers of offsets, including eighty-seven that were U.S. bases. Id. at 9. 
 196. Id. at 5. Trading prices ranged from $0.79 - $7.40 per CO2e. Id. at 
11. 
 197. Midwestern Governors Ass’n, Midwestern Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Accord, Nov. 15, 2007, 
http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/Publications/Greenhouse%20gas%
20accord_Layout%201.pdf. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
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2010.200 This accord will not set a specific target but will attempt to 
cut emissions by 2020. 
Recommendations would allow 10-50% of reductions to be 
achieved through use of offsets.201 There is dispute as to whether 
allowances can come from other states.202 The Midwestern 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord will establish a system to enable 
tracking, managing, and crediting for entities that reduce GHGs.203 
This region depends heavily on coal-fired electric generation, and is 
therefore distinct technologically from both California and the RGGI 
states. 
The RGGI, Western states’, and Midwest states’ carbon-
regulation schemes collectively include about half of the U.S. states 
plus Canadian providences. RGGI affects only CO2 from larger power 
plants, while the regional climate initiatives are looking at GHGs more 
broadly from various economic sectors. 
C. STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD PROGRAMS 
Many states are specifically encouraging renewable energy 
development. Some of these very encouragements are what disqualify 
renewable energy projects under some carbon schemes from 
qualifying as “additional.” Half the states in the United States have 
adopted Renewable Portfolio Standard (“RPS”) programs.204 These 
programs require the covered state to procure a certain percentage of 
total power sales power from designated renewable energy 
technologies. These programs require that a designated renewable 
percentage be deployed each year.205 The sole purpose is to cause the 
deployment of specifically identified renewable power options. This in 
fact also reduces GHG emissions simultaneously. 
However, in the RGGI scheme, these very RPS credits, which 
most of the RGGI states require, would be forfeited to the state if the 
                                                          
 200. Midwestern Governors Ass’n, A Status Report on Midwestern 
Energy and Climate Accords, 
http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/EnergyInitiatives.htm (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2009). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Midwestern Governors Ass’n, Accord, supra note 197. 
 204. RYAN WISER & GALEN BARBOSE, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2008), available at 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-154e.pdf. 
 205. Id. 
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project qualified and was claimed both as an RPS and a RGGI offset 
unit. Here, the state RGGI programs and the state RPS programs 
seem to be at cross purposes. Recognizing the full impact of 
renewable generation projects actually penalizes them. 
1. RPS State Variations and Achievements 
Mandatory RPS programs collectively cover states serving 
roughly 40% of total electric demand in the United States.206 
Representative northeastern state programs roughly corresponding to 
the RGGI area are illustrated in Table 4. By the end of 2007, more 
than twenty-five states and the District of Columbia had enacted RPS 
policies ranging from renewable energy sale requirements on an 
annual basis of 2% to as much as 40% of power from renewable 
energy achieved in successive years.207 State adoption in twenty-four 
states is illustrated in Table 2. 
Table 2 also illustrates which states have adopted renewable 
energy trust funds. The system benefits charge is a tax on utility 
consumption, or surcharge mechanism, for collecting funds from 
electric consumers, the proceeds of which then support a range of 
energy activities through a trust fund. Funds are collected through a 
non-bypassable system benefits charge to users of electric 
distribution services.208 The money raised from the system benefits 
charge is then used to “buy down” the cost of power produced from 
sustainable technologies on both the supply and demand side, so that 
they can compete with more conventional technologies.209 
Among the most populous states, California has a 20% (33% 
under legislative consideration) RPS target by 2020210 and New York 
a 24% target by 2013.211 The definition of what qualifies as renewable 
varies in every state. Most states allow solar, wind, biomass, and 
landfill gas resources to qualify; states are less consistent regarding 
biogas, MSW (“municipal solid waste”), geothermal, all hydro 
resources, fuel cells, and ocean tidal renewable resources.212 In about 
                                                          
 206. Wiser, et al., supra note 88, at 9. 
 207. K. S. CORY & B. G. SWEZEY, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., 
RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS IN THE STATES: BALANCING GOALS AND 
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES 1 (2007), 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/41409.pdf. 
 208.  FERREY, supra note *, § 10:95. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 22. 
 211. Id. at 1. 
 212. Id. at tbl.1. 
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half of the RPS programs, solar energy installations are being 
encouraged in a variety of ways.213 Nine states and the District of 
Columbia established specific solar set-asides in their RPS policies.214 
Several states also award rebates to customers who install solar 
systems.215 
The RPS programs differ by state. Eligible projects technologies 
are set forth in Table 3 below. Some states allow credits to be traded, 
while other states do not. 
 
Table 2: Portfolio Standards and Trust Funds in Various 
States 
State Name 
Renewable Energy 
Trust Fund 
Portfolio 
Standards 
Arizona  x x 
California  x  
Colorado   x 
Connecticut  x x 
Delaware  x  
Hawaii   x 
Illinois  x  
Iowa   x 
Maine   x 
Maryland   x 
Massachusetts  x x 
Minnesota  x x 
Montana  x  
Nevada   x 
New Jersey  x x 
New Mexico   x 
New York  x  
Ohio  x  
                                                          
 213. Id. at 11. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. and tbl.3. 
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Oregon  x  
Pennsylvania  x x 
Rhode Island  x  
Texas   x 
Vermont   x 
Wisconsin x x 
 
 
Table 3: “Renewable” Resources as Defined in State Statutes 
 
State Hydro Tidal Geo-
thermal 
Photo-
voltaic 
Dedicated 
Crops 
AZ  x  x  
CA x  x x  
CT x   x  
IA    x  
IL x   x x 
ME x x x x  
MD  x x x  
MA x x  x x 
State Solar Wind Fuel 
Cell 
Methane 
Landfill 
Bio-
mas
s 
Trash-
to-
Energy 
AZ x x   x  
CA x x  x x x 
CT x x x x x x 
IA x x x  x x 
IL x x   x x 
ME x x x  x x 
MD x x x x x  
MA x x x x x x 
MN  x   x  
NV x x x    
NJ x x x x x x 
NM x x x x x x 
NY x x    x 
OR x x  x  x 
PA x x  x x x 
RI x x  x x x 
TX x x  x x x 
WI x x x  x x 
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MN      
NV   x x  
NJ x x x x  
NM x x x x  
NY x x x x  
OR x x x x x 
PA x  x x x 
RI x   x  
TX x x x x  
WI x x x  x 
Note: Photovoltaic is included within solar in some states; methane 
and or trash-to-energy may be included within a broad definition of 
“biomass.” 
 
Non-compliance penalties vary in each state.216 The non-
compliance penalty can range from around $0.05 per Kwh in 
California, Connecticut, Washington, and Massachusetts, to much 
lower amounts in other states (although New Jersey and New 
Hampshire have equally high penalties for non-compliance with Class 
I emissions).217 In 2005, 62% of the Massachusetts RPS requirement 
was satisfied while 38% of the power sales were required to pay the 
state the penalty of $53.19 per Mwh.218  
The currently applicable required percentage of energy delivered 
from renewables ranges from 2 to 40% of annual retail sales, but 
these numbers can be deceiving depending upon whether preexisting 
renewable resources are eligible and counted.219 Because the 
definitions of renewable energy credits RECs created under various 
state programs differ, there is significant geographic limitation in 
cross-market REC trading and liquidity. 
                                                          
 216. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 207, at tbl.5. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See tbl. 3. 
 219. Id. at 1. 
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Table 4: Seven Northeast State RPS Requirements 
State Requirement Technology 
Eligibility 
Connecticu
t 
3 Classes 
Class I 
technologies: 1% in 
2004 +0.5%/yr; to 
2% by 2006 
+1.5%/yr; to 5% by 
2008; +1%/yr to 
7% in 2010 and 
thereafter 
Class I or II 
technologies: 3% in 
2004 and 
thereafter 
Class I: solar, wind, 
landfill gas, new (post 
7/1/03) run of river 
hydro (<= 5 MW), fuel 
cells, ocean thermal, 
wave or tidal, low-
emission renewable 
energy conversion 
tech., low NOx 
emitting, sustainable 
biomass (Biomass 
facilities with quarterly 
avg. NOx emission rate 
<= 0.075 lbs. per 
MMBTU. Existing (pre 
7/1/03) biomass 
facilities <= 500 kW 
are exempt from NOx 
emission requirement.) 
Class II: MSW, existing 
(prior to 7/1/03) run 
of river hydro (<= 5 
MW), other biomass 
(facilities must have 
quarterly avg. NOx 
emission rate <= 0.2 
lbs. per MMBTU) 
Maine 30% of sales in 
2000 (start of 
competition) and 
thereafter as a 
condition of 
licensing. 
Fuel cells, tidal power, 
solar, wind, 
geothermal, hydro, 
biomass, and MSW 
(under 100 MW) 
High efficiency cogen. 
systems of unlimited 
size. 
Maryland Tier 1 Renewables: 
1% in 2006, 
increasing 1% 
biannually to 7% in 
Tier 1: solar, wind, 
biomass, landfill gas, 
geothermal, ocean, fuel 
cells (renewable 
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State Requirement Technology 
Eligibility 
2018, increasing to 
7.5% in 2019, and 
thereafter 
Tier 1 or 2 
Renewables: 2.5% 
2006-2018 
sources only), and 
small hydro (< 30 MW) 
Tier 2: hydro, MSW, 
and incineration of 
poultry litter 
Massachu- 
setts 
 
1% of sales from 
new renewables by 
2003 +0.5%/yr. to 
4% in 2009; +1 % 
per year thereafter 
until date 
determined by 
Division of Energy 
Resources. 
 
Solar, wind, ocean 
thermal, wave, tidal, 
landfill gas, and low-
emission advanced 
biomass beginning 
commercial operation 
or representing 
increase in capacity at 
existing facility after 
12/31/97. Hydro and 
MSW qualify as 
existing and are not 
eligible. 
New Jersey 
3 Classes 
Class I or II 
Technologies: 2.5% 
by 2004-2008. 
Class I 
technologies: 
0.74% in 2004; 
0.983% in 2005; 
2.037% in 2006; 
2.924% in 2007; 
and 3.84% in 2008. 
Solar Electric: 
0.01% in 2004; 
0.017% in 2005; 
0.0393% in 2006; 
0.0817% in 2007; 
and 0.16% in 2008. 
NJBPU sets 
requirements for 
2009 and after, but 
must be at or 
Class I: solar, wind, 
geothermal, wave, tidal 
energy, landfill gas, 
fuel cells, sustainable 
biomass 
Class II: MSW or hydro 
(<30 MW) that meets 
high environmental 
standards 
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State Requirement Technology 
Eligibility 
above 2008 levels 
(see comments 
regarding proposed 
RES requirements 
through 2020. 
 
New York New renewable 
energy 
requirement: 0.8% 
in 2006, increasing 
~0.8%/yr to 6.56% 
in 2013. 
Customer-sited tier 
is 2% of total 
annual RES 
targets. 
With existing 
baseline renewable 
energy, and 
generation 
expected from state 
purchase 
requirement, 
renewable energy 
increases from 
19.45% in 2003 to 
24% in 2013 (an 
additional 1% is 
expected to come 
from voluntary 
green pricing 
programs). 
 
Main Tier, wind, solar, 
ocean, biomass, 
biogas, fuel cells, 
incremental hydro, 
and low-impact run-of-
river hydro > 30 MW 
Customer Tier: solar, 
wind (<300kW), fuel 
cells, and methane 
digesters. 
Rhode 
Island 
3% by 2007, 
increasing 0.5%/yr 
to 4.5% in 2010, 
then increasing by 
1 %/yr. to 8.5% in 
2014, then 
increasing by 
Solar, wind, ocean, 
geothermal, biomass, 
co-firing, hydro (< 30 
MW), fuel cells using 
renewable resources 
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State Requirement Technology 
Eligibility 
1.5%/yr. to 16% in 
2019. 
Requirement 
remains at 16% in 
2020 and 
thereafter unless 
the PUC 
determines it is no 
longer necessary. 
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2. The Value of Renewable Credits and Offsets 
RPS compliance raises the price of power by including the 
necessity of retail sellers of electricity to purchase allowances. This 
price impact of RPS-mandated renewable energy projects has been 
estimated to range between a 0.1% increase in retail rates to 
consumers (in Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York) to up to 
1.1% retail rate impact in Massachusetts.220 In 2005 Massachusetts 
collected $13 million in alternative compliance payments under its 
RPS system, a number which is expected to expand about 25% in 
following years. 
Significant regulatory uncertainty exists around RPS programs. 
Either a regulatory change in eligible projects,221 or court 
interpretation of these programs,222 can cause great volatility in RECs 
pricing.223 For example, Connecticut Class I resources were originally 
defined to include wind, landfill methane, fuel cell, and solar voltaic 
resources, and REC prices ranged from $35 to $50 per REC with this 
definition. However, in June 2003 the Legislature amended the 
definitions to add certain biomass generation plants located in New 
England as Class I resources if they reduced NOx emissions.224 The 
Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control made an advisory 
ruling that an existing biomass plant located in Maine “retooled” to 
meet a lower NOx emission standard would qualify for Class I 
                                                          
 220. Wiser, et al., supra note 88, at Fig. 4. An impact of not more than 
approximately 1% is forecast to be the cost of this implementation. Id. 
 221. The Connecticut Regulatory Authority allowed a number of 
preexisting biomass plants to qualify for RECs, increasing the supply of 
RECs and significantly depressing the price of RECs certificates in 2005. 
 222. Prices of RECs in Texas fell after a legal interpretation of 
regulatory discretion in that state’s RPS program. 
 223. Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Big Is Beautiful: The 
Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 
ELECTRICITY J., May 2007, at 48, 52 (quoting Ryan Wiser et al., Evaluating 
Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States, 10 
MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 237, 243–44 
(2005)). El Paso Electric took a dispute all the way to the New Mexico 
Supreme Court. See N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. 
Regulation Comm’n, 168 P.3d 105 (N.M. 2007) (outlining factual and 
procedural background of dispute). 
 224. Clean Energy States Alliance, Progress Report: Review of State 
Renewable Portfolio Standard Programs in the Northeast & Mid-Atlantic 
Regions, (Dec. 2008), at 39, 
http://www.cleanenergystates.org/Publications/CESA_Progress_Report_P
orter_NE-MA_Regional_RPS_Dec2008.pdf. 
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Connecticut RECs.225 The market for Class I RECs came crashing 
down, dropping the forward price for 2006 RECs by approximately 
90%, from near $35 per Mwh to near $2.50 per Mwh.226 Prices later 
jumped back to near $30 to $50 per REC.227 
It is estimated that roughly half of new renewable energy power 
capacity in the United States over the last decade has developed in 
states with RPS programs in place.228 Over 90% of these capacity 
additions have come from wind power, with biomass and geothermal 
resources in second and third position.229 Even though RPS is a 
powerful relative tool, the total renewable power development still is 
not large. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory has estimated 
that RPS programs may result in only 8 to 12 GW of new wind 
capacity (about 1% of U.S. installed total capacity) relative to a base 
case where no RPS programs existed.230 Therefore, the total 
contribution of RPS programs appears modest in terms of total U.S. 
power resources, no matter what tools are used. 
State RPS standards have failed to substantially increase the 
deployment of renewable energy technologies on a national scale.231 
Non-hydroelectric renewable energy resources continue to hover 
around 2% of the U.S. electricity supply.232 Therefore, while various 
                                                          
 225. See Application for Advisory Ruling on Eligibility for Class I 
Renewable Status Pursuant to Connecticut’s Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, 246 P.U.R.4th 355, Docket No. 05-03-12 (Aug. 10, 2005) (final 
decision). 
 226. RECs Tank in Connecticut; Project May Suffer, ELECTRIC POWER 
DAILY, Nov. 22, 2005, at 5. 
 227. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 207, at fig.4, p. 18. 
 228. Wiser, et al., supra note 88 (quoting an estimate by that half of the 
capacity equals approximately 5,500 MW). 
 229. Id. 
 230. N. BLAIR ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., LONG-TERM 
NATIONAL IMPACTS OF STATE-LEVEL POLICIES 13–14 (2006), 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy06osti/40105.pdf. 
 231. See generally Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 223 (explaining why 
individual state RPS programs are insufficient, and national legislation is 
needed). 
 232. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2007: WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2030, at 86 (2006), 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/forecasting/0383(2007).pdf. By the year 
2030 the share of biomass resources is expected to almost double from 
1% (in 2005) to 1.8% of total generation; wind is forecast to triple its 
percentage from the current 0.4% to approximately 0.9%, while 
geothermal power resources are projected to hold steady at 0.4% of 
generation. Id at 85–86. “Grid-connected solar generation increases to 0.1 
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renewable technologies are projected to double or triple their gross 
amount of power contribution, this is not projected to have a 
significant impact for two reasons. First, these renewable technologies 
are starting from a very small base so that even a large percentage 
increase translates to a relatively small absolute increase. Second, 
electricity demand in the United States is increasing, so the 
contribution of any given project is a progressively smaller percentage 
of the increasing generation base. 
Non-hydroelectric renewable energy deployment is expected to 
rise from about 2% to about 4% by 2030.233 Fossil-fired energy 
resources are projected to maintain a roughly 70% share of total 
electric generation in the United States and an 86% share of total U.S. 
primary energy supply (including the transportation sector) in 
2030.234 Therefore, a radical departure is not projected by the U.S. 
government between now and 2030 in fossil fuel use in the power 
sector. 
The RPS program is the positive incentive for renewable power 
development, regardless of “additionality.” It contrasts with carbon 
regulation which operates negatively to prohibit certain high-carbon 
use of fossil fuels for power generation. Carbon regulation does not 
necessarily result in more deployment of renewable energy for power 
production. Offsets and additionality requirements shape how 
compliance is achieved. 
It is critical to contrast the U.S. treatment of offsets and 
additionality with what is transpiring under the Kyoto Protocol. This 
is important because it predates U.S. regulation, and currently 
imposes obligations on 38 countries. It is the model for future world 
GHG control. 
VI. THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
The Kyoto Protocol is the existing, and by all indications the 
likely future continuing form of world carbon regulation. The April 
2008 Bangkok Kyoto talks concluded that a post-2012 international 
carbon scheme should look much like the pre-2012 Kyoto regime, 
with trading of allowances and the creation of additional offsets.235 All 
                                                          
percent of total generation in 2030.” Id. at 85. 
 233. Id. at 86. This, of course, could be changed significantly by a 
variety of tax and regulatory programs that would more robustly promote 
renewable power than was the case at the time that these assumptions 
were made for the study in 2006. 
 234. Id. at 2. 
 235. Eric Lyman, “‘Progress’ of Bangkok Talks Shows Much Still to be 
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industrialized countries in the world are bound by the Protocol, 
except for the United States. Proximate U.S. neighbor, Canada, is 
bound by the Protocol restrictions on carbon. Four Canadian 
provinces are members of the Western Climate Initiative and the 
Midwestern Greenhouse Reduction Accord carbon programs 
discussed above. How the Kyoto Protocol regulates carbon and carbon 
offsets becomes relevant. The United States may choose to ratify the 
Protocol, having signed it originally. As an international agreement, if 
ratified by the Congress, it would become an enforceable requirement 
on American industry. 
A. OPERATION IN DEVELOPED COVERED NATIONS 
The Kyoto Protocol is a cap-and-trade regulatory construct on 
carbon emissions. The Kyoto Protocol requires 35 developed ratifying 
nations by 2012 to reduce CO2 emissions an average of 7% below 
1990 baseline levels.236 The other GHGs must be reduced to 5% to 
7% below either their 1990 or 1995 baseline levels by 2008 to 
2012.237 Each of 35 developed nations is allocated a national 
emissions cap, which applies to certain large industrial emitters of 
carbon within the country. Assigned amount units (“AAUs”), or Kyoto 
allowances, may be traded among Annex 1 countries.238 
Each of these nations decides how to impose limitations on its 
local industries so that it emits within its internationally allocated 
                                                          
Done for 2009 Global Agreement,” BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER, Apr. 11, 
2008, at 704. 
 236. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto 
Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. The Kyoto 
Protocol received subsequent national adoption by Annex I (developed 
country) party signatories that accounted in total for at least 55% of the 
total carbon dioxide emissions from 1990 for that group, notably 
excluding the United States, by February 2005 and then entered into 
effect. While most countries have committed to achieve an eight percent 
reduction below 1990 levels for CO2, there has been a reallocation among 
European Union countries so that some countries are allowed to emit 
more than these baseline levels while others are required to reduce up to 
28%, with the weighted average for the European Union overall being 
eight percent reduction. 
 237. Id. For six GHGs that are suspected of causing global warming, 
principally including CO2 and methane (CH4), major developed countries 
(called the Annex I parties) have targets for reduction of these GHGs in 
the period 2008 to 2012. One hundred sixty-two countries ratified the 
Protocol. 
 238. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, supra note 189, art. 6. 
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AAUs in a given year. At the end of each compliance period of one 
year, each emitter must have acquired through allocation from their 
governments or through purchase or trade enough additional 
allocation credits to cover its carbon emissions during that period. In 
essence, each emitter must cover its emissions with regulatory credits 
to emit carbon. 
Those covered emitters of carbon needing additional allowances 
can either create or purchase additional allowances through two 
mechanisms described below.239 Annex 1 countries must set up 
national registries to issue their internationally assigned amount of 
AAUs.240 Registry removal units (“RMUs”) reflecting removal of GHGs 
due to forestry and land-use practices, also are tracked.241 Each AAU 
and RMU is tracked with a unique serial number.242 AAUs and RMUs 
are converted into emission reduction units (“ERUs”) for international 
trading purposes.243 
B. THE EUROPEAN UNION KYOTO COUNTRIES PROGRAM 
The twenty-five E.U. members constitute the core of the thirty-
five Annex 1 Kyoto countries.244 As a parallel and coordinated carbon 
reduction system, the European Union established a separate 
regulatory system, different from Kyoto in that it only covers CO2, not 
all GHGs. Phase II of the EU-ETS corresponds to the Kyoto 2008-
2012 initial phase.245 The EU-ETS includes any combustion source 
exceeding 20 Mw.246 Households, the agricultural sector, and 
transportation are excluded.247 The E.U. system caps emissions of 
                                                          
 239. See infra Section VI.C. 
 240. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Report 
of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, held at Marrakesh 
from 29 October to 10 November 2001, U.N. Doc Decision 19/CP. 
7/FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002), at 12 [hereinafter UNFCCC, 
Seventh Session]. 
 241. U.N. Framework on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol Reference 
Manual, at 14–15, 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/08_unfccc_kp_ref_manual.
pdf. 
 242. Id. at 22. 
 243. Id. at 17. 
 244. Id. at 13. 
 245. A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, 1 REV. 
OF ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 66, 67 (2007). 
 246. Id. at 69. 
 247. See id. at 72, n.9 (lists categories included). 
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about 4500 companies at 11,500 installations.248 
Under the EU-ETS scheme trading is allowed.249 Trading in EU-
ETS CO2 allowances hit $30 billion in 2006, according to the World 
Bank.250 
The EU-ETS is linked to the Kyoto Protocol;251 the E.U. Linking 
Directive connects the EU-ETS system to the Kyoto Protocol JI and 
CDM mechanisms.252 Differences exist: eligible CERs from land-use 
and forestry projects cannot be applied as EU-ETS credits,253 and 
there are percentage limitations on compliance use of CERs.254 The 
EU-ETS is also linked with programs in Iceland, Liechtenstein, and 
Norway, which are not members of the European Union.255 Within 
these limits, both Certified Emission Reductions (“CERs”) and ERUs 
are fully fungible with the E.U. AAUs and can be traded and banked 
until 2012 with the EU-ETS Phase II for purposes of E.U. 
compliance.256 It is unclear as to whether any U.S. federal or state 
carbon regulations will link with the E.U. or Kyoto schemes. 
The E.U. system regulates only about 40% of the carbon 
emitters. The result along with use of external offsets has been that 
rather than reducing carbon output, carbon dioxide emissions rose 
1.1% in 2007.257 It is difficult to conclude that the E.U. system 
                                                          
 248. Id. at 68. This covers larger steel, combustion facilities, oil 
refineries, pulp and paper mills, cement, ceramics, and glass facilities. 
Aviation was not included. See id. at 72, n.9. 
 249. Council Directive 2003/87/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (amending 
Council Directive 96/61/EC). The EU-ETS market trades between 5 to 15 
million tons of allowances each week. 
 250. Ball, supra note 14, at A1. 
 251. Council Directive 2004/101/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18 (“The 
Linking Directive,” amending Directive 2003/87/EC). 
 252. See generally id. 
 253. Id. at art. 11(a)(3). 
 254. Id. 
 255. TERRY BAKER ET AL., RESPONSE TO THE REVISION OF THE EU’S 
EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM BY EUROPEAN UNION SUBCOMMITTEE D 5 
(Cambridge Center for Climate Change Mitigation Research) (2008), 
available at 
http://www.landecon.cam.ac.uk/research/eeprg/4cmr/pdf/Evidence%2
0to%20House%20of%20Lords%20EU%20Committee%20from%204CMR.p
df. 
 256. Id. 
 257. EU Trading Experience Cited By Opponents, Backers of Lieberman-
Warner, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, May 9, 2008, 
http://carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/show/eu_trading_experie
nce_cited_by_opponents_backers_of_lieberman_warner/. 
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resulted in any carbon reductions that would not have occurred in 
the absence of the cap-and-trade system.258 Others concede that 
$100 per barrel of oil may be more responsible than carbon regulation 
for any reduction in carbon.259 U.S. Representative Peter DeFazio 
noted that E.U. carbon markets have caused speculators to profit on 
the E.U. cap-and-trade system.260 
The U.S. Congress’ Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) in 
November 2008 reported to Congress on the lessons of the EU-
ETS:261  
● The high cost of producing CDM offsets as less costly options; 
● The failure of up to 40% of CDM offsets to meet “additionality” 
requirements in fact; 
● The little positive impact on sustainable development; 
● The failure of undesired “leakage” of carbon, protected by free 
allocation of allowances rather than auction of allowances. 
The EU-ETS, featuring twenty-seven (plus three non-EU 
European countries also participating in this trading scheme) of the 
thirty-eight Kyoto-regulated countries, is the core of the Kyoto 
Protocol implementation. The EU-ETS mirrors the Kyoto Protocol; 
however it began three years earlier in 2005. Both the Kyoto Protocol 
and the EU-ETS have established the model for offsets and 
“additionality” in world carbon regulation. We turn to those next. 
C. “ADDITIONALITY” AND OFFSETS 
Industrial emitters in each Kyoto country are able to trade 
emission credits or create new credits through mechanisms to gain 
additional credits. Kyoto has one mechanism to trade allocated 
allowances among countries and another to create additional offsets 
for export from developing nations. 
1. Offsets 
The Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) allows projects that 
reduce greenhouses gases in developing nations to earn CERs for 
                                                          
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-151, INTERNATIONAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION’S 
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL’S CLEAN 
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM (2008) [hereinafter INT’L CLIMATE CHANGE]. 
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each ton of CO2-equivalent (“CO2e”) of GHG reduced.262 The CDM 
apparatus emerged as a last-minute compromise creation of the 1997 
Kyoto Conference.263 It is patterned on the U.S. SO2 trading 
experience, now gone multinational.264 
CDM projects may only be pursued by Annex 1 countries.265 
Those CERs are then traded or sold to activities in Annex I developed 
countries and increase that country’s emission cap allocated in the 
Protocol.266 CDM offsets under Kyoto Protocol must pass the 
requirement of “additionality,” but it does not exclude renewable 
energy projects, and in fact encourages them, contrary to the RGGI 
scheme.267 
A key issue with offsets is whether they are real, measurable, 
and verifiable. All emissions reduction CERs certified under the CDM 
are required by the Protocol to be voluntary, real, and additional to 
any that would occur in the absence of the CDM credit system.268 The 
Kyoto Protocol process requires between 18 and 24 months to register 
and verify CERs.269 The typical CDM project takes about 300 days 
from the comment period that starts the validation process to 
registration of the project.270 It is estimated that the cost of 
developing a new methodology for approval of CDM projects is 
                                                          
 262. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, supra note 189, art. 12. 
 263. CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE TO CARBON LAW AND PRACTICE 31 (Paul 
Q. Watchman ed., 2008). 
 264. Id. at 132-33. 
 265. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, supra note 189, art. 12; UNFCCC, Seventh Session, 
supra note 240. 
 266. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, supra note 189, art. 6. Credits earned after 2000 can be 
used to achieve compliance during first commitment period which begins 
in 2008. Two and a half percent of ERUs and CERs may be carried over to 
the second phase of implementation after 2012. 
 267. For a discussion of RGGI, see supra Part III. 
 268. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, supra note 189, art. 12, § 5. 
 269. Craig A. Hart, The Clean Development Mechanism: Considerations 
for Investors and Policy Makers, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Spring 
2007, at 41, 46. 
 270. THE CARBON RATING AGENCY, CARBON RATINGS 3 (2008), at 4, 
http://www.opencarbonworld.com/carbon-
library/The%20Carbon%20Rating%20Agency%20-
%20Performance%20of%20CDM%20and%20Offset%20Projects.pdf. 
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approximately $150,000.271 Methodologies often require an average of 
280 days for approval.272 
2. Trading among developed countries 
A second Kyoto mechanism for compliance is JI where developed 
nation signatory parties can implement projects in their own or other 
Annex I nations that remove GHGs or create additional carbon sinks, 
which are then quantified in an Emission Reduction Unit (“ERU”).273 
An ERU transfers a unit of allowed carbon emissions from a selling 
country’s cap to the purchasing country’s AAU cap.274 
Unlike a CDM CER, which creates an additional emission unit 
added to the world’s carbon cap, a JI project transfers a credit under 
the existing cap from one nation to another nation, without changing 
the gross world cap.275 Whereas the CDM process creates additional 
room in the envelope of permissible carbon emissions by developed 
nations, the Joint Implementation process transfers a static quantity 
of existing allocated credits under the cap from one developed nation 
to another. The former mechanism creates more room for carbon. Not 
surprisingly, the volume of CDM CERs was approximately 30 times 
that of JI ERUs in 2006.276 
JI projects have less burdensome associated regulatory 
transaction costs than CDM projects as the former are approved and 
administered by the parties involved, rather than the U.N. Kyoto 
Executive Board for CERs, and are not subject to detailed periodic 
monitoring.277 CERs (other than for afforestation) have a seven-year 
                                                          
 271. Hart, supra note 269, at 46. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, supra note 189, art. 6. 
 274. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Joint 
Implementation, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint_implementation/ite
ms/1674.php. 
 275. See id. Whereas the CDM process creates additional room in the 
envelope of permissible carbon emissions by developed nations, the Joint 
Implementation process transfers a static quantity of existing allocated 
credits under the cap from one developed nation to another. Thus, the 
emission cap of any country includes assigned Kyoto credit units plus 
removal units (“RMUs”) from forestation projects that remove CO2 from 
the atmosphere, plus JI ERUs and CDM CERs. 
 276. THE WORLD BANK STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON MARKET 2007, 
at 3 (2007), 
http://www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/getfile.php?docID=2281. 
 277. See CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE TO CARBON LAW AND PRACTICE, supra 
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lifetime, with the possibility of two renewals, for a total of twenty-one 
years, or in the alternative one ten-year lifetime.278 CDM offsets 
created between 2000 and 2007 can be used for compliance in the 
2008 to 2012 Kyoto compliance period.279 
3. “Additionality” 
CDM CERs and JI ERUs are required to be legally additional to 
baseline project emissions.280 This involves the establishment of an 
individual emissions baseline, taking account of sector reform 
initiatives, barriers to expansion, and sector expansion plans.281 
Early entrants in the CDM protocol established less stringent 
guidelines of additionality than now demanded.282 The requirement 
for CDM CERs also includes the certification by the host developing 
nation that the project supports its goals for sustainable 
development.283 This has been defined as “development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
                                                          
note 263, at 57. 
 278. U. N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 
Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol on its first session, held at Montreal from 28 November 
to 10 December 2005, Decision 5/CMP.1, UN Doc 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (2006); [UNFCCC, First Session], 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a01.pdf. 
 279. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, supra note 189, arts. 3, 12. 
 280. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Clean 
Development Mechanism, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mecha
nism/items/2718.php; U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Joint Implementation, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint_implementation/ite
ms/1674.php. 
 281. UNFCCC, First Session, supra note 278, at 16–17. 
 282. CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE TO CARBON LAW AND PRACTICE, supra 
note 263, at 62. 
 283. Under the Kyoto Protocol this is embodied in a Letter of Approval 
(“LoA”) from the host country Designated National Authority (“DNA”). See 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Clean 
Development Mechanism, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mecha
nism/items/2718.php. After receiving the LoA and being verified by an 
authorized third party, the CDM project is ready to be certified as creating 
CERs. This is done by the CDM Executive Board, or for a JI project the JI 
Supervisory Committee. 
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generations to meet their own needs.”284 Long-term renewable energy 
developments clearly satisfy this definition, while many of the other 
CDM projects that have created CERs may be more questionable. 
Thus, the emission cap of any country includes assigned Kyoto 
AAUs, credit units plus removal units (“RMUs”) from forestation 
projects that remove CO2 from the atmosphere, plus JI ERUs and 
CDM CERs. Under the Kyoto Protocol CDM CERs and JI ERUs can be 
used in future compliance to satisfy up to 2.5% of the party’s annual 
allowed emissions. However, CERs and ERUs obtained prior to 2008 
can be fully banked for use in the 2008 to 2012 compliance period.285 
The Kyoto Protocol does not place limits on the use of excess 
allowances other than that tradable allowances must be supplemental 
to significant domestic measures to reduce GHG emissions.286 
To scale the role of offsets, the over-allocation of emission 
allowances in the European Union on May 26, 2007 would displace 
18% of the expected CERs from the CDM projects validated as of May 
2007.287 When it was announced that verified emissions were 41 
million metric tons of CO2e, or approximately 2.5% lower than 
expected,288 the EUA market of the EU-ETS plunged 67% in price.289 
Eastern European excess emission allowances will have an 
impact. Most excess emission allowances are held by Russia and 
Ukraine.290 These are expected to be in excess of 100 million metric 
tons of CO2e per year. These excess emission allowances are 
approximately 33% of validated CDM emissions reductions as of May 
1, 2007 and almost one-half the number of CERs expected to be 
issued assuming a validation estimate error of 27%.291 By 2012 the 
CDM mechanism will have produced enough carbon offsets to equal 
                                                          
 284. THE WORLD COMM’N ON ENVTL. DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 8 
(1987). 
 285. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, supra note 189, art. 12. 
 286. UNFCCC, Seventh Session, supra note 240, at CMP 1. 
 287. Hart, supra note 269, at 44. 
 288. Heather Timmons, Data Leaks Shake Up Carbon Trade, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 16, 2006, at C1. 
 289. Hart, supra note 269, at 44. 
 290. Id. at 43–45. 
 291. Id. at 44–45 (utilizing UNEP data). For the first 175 CDM projects 
that issued CERs, the validation procedure overestimated the number of 
CERs produced by approximately 27% on average, with a standard 
deviation error of 42.5%. As of May 2007, there were more than 1800 
CDM projects that had estimated their emission reductions through the 
validation process but not all had verified all their CERs. Id. at 42–45. 
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the carbon emissions of the United Kingdom over three years.292  
Of note, renewable projects, although freely allowed to create 
CER offsets, are not a large share of CDM projects. Developers of 
Kyoto CDM projects in developing nations are trapping methane and 
flaring it, without turning it into electricity and without additional 
marginal cost in the process.293 Renewable energy projects account 
for 28 percent of CDM CERs. Methane capture and flaring projects 
producing no electricity, mostly located at large landfills, coal mines, 
and CAFOs, account for 19 percent of CERs.294 Even in the U.S., 
methane is being flared to garner offsets, even though such flaring is 
not “additional,” and could create power resources rather than just 
being flared as a waste material.295 
These methane trapping projects offer easy solutions to reduce 
GHGs, but perpetuate the need for electricity for the community from 
other conventional fossil-fuel sources. “The CDM has, for a variety of 
reasons, been largely unsuccessful in encouraging real and significant 
changes in developing countries.”296 CDM “has been disappointingly 
ineffective at achieving its goal of effecting fundamental shifts toward 
cleaner energy production . . . ..”297 The European Union is proposing 
to further limit emission allowances granted to renewable energy 
projects.298 
These CDM programs were originally a late minor add-on to the 
Kyoto Protocol.299 The current Kyoto Protocol does not require the 
                                                          
 292. THE CARBON RATING AGENCY, supra note 272, at 3. 
 293. Author’s observation from his extensive work around the world 
advising on carbon policy. See Kris Christen, Environmental Impacts of 
Gas Flaring, Venting Add Up, ENVTL. SCI. & TECH., Dec. 15, 2004, 
http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es0406886 (explaining gas flaring); 
see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-809, NATURAL GAS 
FLARING AND VENTING: OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE DATA AND REDUCE 
EMISSIONS (2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04809.pdf. 
 294. Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s 
Performance and Potential, 55 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1759, 1779 (2008). 
 295. Rethinking Offsets, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Oct. 6, 2008, 
http://carboncontrolnews.com/.  
 296. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE: A 
STRATEGY FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 5 (2008), 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Climate_ChangeT
F.pdf. 
 297. Id. at 49. 
 298. Revised EU GHG-Trading Program May Shape U.S. Proposals, 
supra note 101. 
 299. Ball, supra note 14, at A-19. 
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installation of renewable technologies anywhere, but rather only 
requires the reduction of carbon emissions, which may or may not 
involve the installation of renewable generation.300 This is more 
accommodating than the RGGI prohibition of renewable energy 
projects. Nonetheless, the impact of CDM projects has not been to 
promote appropriate long-term technology-transfer renewable 
investments in developing countries, but rather has served to create 
additional credits for traditional emitters in Annex 1 countries.301 
CDM projects implemented by the market to date are charged with 
having focused on maximizing the number of CERs created for 
investors, rather than focusing on renewable energy projects and 
sustainable alternatives in developing countries.302 
The failure to assure “additionality” of CDM CERs caused the 
Congressional GAO to conclude that the “evidence indicates that the 
CDM has had a limited effect on sustainable development.”303 GAO 
concluded that by encouraging the lowest-cost means for a developer 
to reduce carbon, the CDM scheme, it disadvantages measures that 
contribute to sustainable development. GAO concluded that the 
emphasis on reduction of HFC-23 GHGs “do little to promote efficient 
energy use or contribute to long-term sustainable development 
objectives.”304 GAO concluded that developing countries that host 
CDM projects dilute the stringent contribution of CDM programs to 
sustainable development, because of competing for these projects to 
be located in their countries. 
Despite the variety of opportunities for carbon reduction, HFC-23 
reduction projects, targeting one of the minor GHGs set forth in Table 
1 that constitutes less than 1% of total GHG emissions, not only 
dominate CDM programs to date, “but earn more money from the 
offsets . . . than from selling the primary material [produced in the 
manufacturing process].”305 CERs to date address high GWP (“global 
                                                          
 300. Renewable portfolio requirements, as employed in about half of 
the U.S. states, actually reward the installation of renewable electric 
generation technologies. See Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, supra note 81, at 
507–08. 
 301. Christina Voigt, Is the Clean Development Mechanism Sustainable? 
Some Critical Aspects, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 15, 17 (2008). 
 302. Id. 
 303. INT’L CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 261, at 43–46. 
 304. Id. at 44. 
 305. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN A GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM: POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND 
CONCERNS CRS-7 (2008), 
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/08July/RL34436.pdf. 
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warming potential”) industrial gases such as trifluoromethane (HFC-
23) and N2O as well as CH4 emitted by landfills and confined-animal-
feeding operations (“CAFOs”).306 Two relatively obscure industries—
adipic acid and chlorodifluoromethane (HCFC-22) production CDM 
projects dominate. Adipic acid is the feedstock for the production of 
nylon-66 and releases abundant N2O as a production byproduct. 
HCFC-22 has two major applications. It is one of two major 
refrigerants that were phased in to replace the CFC’s under the 
Montreal Protocol to Protect on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer. HCFC-22 is also the primary feedstock in the production of 
Dupont Teflon. These two relatively small industries represent nearly 
55 % of the supply of issued CERs in the CDM to date. Indeed, the 
industrial gas emissions that account for one third of CDM reductions 
do not even occur in the developed world, not because of an absence 
of adipic acid or HCFC-22 manufacture, but because industries 
abated them voluntarily and destroy them.307 
Renewable energy projects contribute more to sustainable 
development than these projects that have so far dominated the 
CDM.308 Without regulatory changes, manufacturing process 
changes, rather than renewable energy and sustainable development 
investments, are projected to continue to dominate the Kyoto offset 
system.309 How does additionality frustrate renewable power offset 
projects implemented as part of carbon control? 
VII. THE NONADDITIVE NEW MATH OF “ADDITIONALITY”: 
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS INTERFACING WITH 
RENEWABLE POWER IMPERATIVES 
The greatest concerns about carbon trading are the requirements 
of “additionality” and verification of offsets.310There is a palpable legal 
tension between the legal requirement of additionality for eligible 
offsets and the technical reality that renewable power is being left 
behind by carbon regulation programs internationally and within both 
the European Union and United States The ill-defined concept of 
additionality has created the gap and regulatory disconnect. Where it 
                                                          
 306. Wara, supra note 294, at 1778–79. 
 307. Id. at 1780. 
 308. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN A GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM: POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND 
CONCERNS, supra note 305, at CRS-11. 
 309. Id. at CRS-11 to CRS-12. 
 310. CARBON OFFSETS, supra note 8, at 25. 
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came from and how it became a legal requirement has important 
repercussions. 
A. THE GENESIS AND OPERATION OF LEGAL “ADDITIONALITY” 
A GHG offset can be defined “as the reduction, removal or 
avoidance of GHG emissions from a specific project that is used to 
compensate for emissions occurring elsewhere.”311 Offsets are the 
alternative compliance mechanism to direct reductions of carbon at 
regulated emission sources. They create an alternative venture to 
eliminate carbon away from the regulated sources, register such 
savings virtually, and trade such virtual assets to demonstrate carbon 
compliance. They empower another off-site activity to create a 
transferable carbon reduction credit. In the Kyoto Annex 1 countries, 
the EU-ETS, and the U.S. state programs, trading platforms exists for 
the trading of offsets.312 The Congressional Research Service of the 
U.S. Congress called emission offsets “a critical design element.”313 
Including offsets, whether additional or not, in a cap-and-trade 
system offers several advantages: 
• It allows lower-cost reduction opportunities outside the 
capped region to be pursued; it also incentivizes more 
cost-effective methods. 
• Economic sectors that are covered by the carbon 
emissions caps can be the source for reductions. This 
can include emission sources not otherwise cost-
effectively addressed. 
• Offsets can be credited for early reductions or for 
innovative technologies. 
• They can promote technology transfer to developing 
countries. 
• Offsets substantially dampen the price of compliance, by 
widening the array of compliance options.314  
                                                          
 311. OFFSET QUALITY INITIATIVE, ENSURING OFFSET QUALITY 1 (2008), 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Executive%20Summary-OQI-
Ensuring-Offset-Quality-white-paper.pdf. 
 312. For examples of exchanges, see generally European Energy 
Exchange, http://www.eex.com/de/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2009); European 
Climate Exchange, http://www.ecx.eu/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2009); Nord 
Pool, Portal, http://www.nordpool.com/en/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
 313. CONG.RESEARCH SERV., supra note 305, at Summary. 
 314. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA ANALYSIS OF THE CLIMATE 
STEWARDSHIP AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2007 (2007) [hereinafter EPA, 
CLIMATE STEWARDSHIP], 
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Traditionally, offsets have offered an incentive for lower-cost 
compliance options.315 The use of unlimited offsets for compliance 
increases the compliance options and by increasing supply can 
decrease total costs of compliance by an estimated 71%.316 Prices 
paid in global and U.S. markets for the sale of offsets ranged from 
$1.83 to $306 per ton of CO2e, with a volume weighted average price 
of $6.317 Of the projects tracked that produced offsets, only twenty-
three of the 211 in the United States occurred in the ten RGGI states, 
which is the only place where they currently have regulatory value.318 
Where unlimited use of offsets is allowed, compliance can occur 
external to the regulated power plant sources.319 If generating facility 
reductions are the least expensive mode, then reductions will be made 
there. However, if there are not low-cost reductions at the regulated 
facilities themselves, then competition for the available supply of 
reductions will cause the clearing price of allowances at the margin to 
increase, at which point under the RGGI program a larger percentage 
of offsets may be employed due to the increase in cost. 
During the next decade, a 10% use of offsets would meet the 
entire share of legal reductions required under the RGGI.320 RGGI 
allows offsets to satisfy between 3.3 to 10% of legal compliance 
obligations.321 This may seem like a minor percentage until one 
realizes that RGGI requires no state reduction in carbon between 
2009 and 2015, and then a cumulative 10% reduction by 2018.322 
Under certain pricing contingencies, all compliance with carbon 
reductions could occur away from, and unrelated to, the regulated 
                                                          
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/s280fullbrief.pdf; U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA ANALYSIS OF THE LIEBERMAN-WARNER CLIMATE 
SECURITY ACT OF 2008 (2008) [hereinafter EPA ANALYSIS OF LIEBERMAN-
WARNER], 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/s2191_EPA_Analysis.pdf; 
CONG.RESEARCH SERV., supra note 305, at CRS-12 to CRS-14; U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, EPA ANALYSIS OF THE CLIMATE STEWARDSHIP AND INNOVATION 
ACT OF 2007 (2007) [hereinafter EPA, CLIMATE STEWARDSHIP]. 
 315. See Stephanie L. Wilson, Dog Days of Climate Change: Heating the 
Debate for Federal Cap-and-Trade, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 163, 
170-72 (2008) (discussing cost effective offset programs). 
 316. See CARBON OFFSETS, supra note 8, at 33. 
 317. Id. at 7. 
 318. Id. at 16–18. 
 319. Id. at 36. 
 320. RGGI Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 61, at 3. 
 321. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-6.5(a)(3)(i)-(iii). 
 322. RGGI Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 61, at 3. 
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RGGI power generating facilities. The use of offsets for compliance 
increases the compliance options and by increasing supply can 
decrease total costs of compliance, by an estimated 71 %.323 If it is 
cheaper to conserve energy end-use in office buildings and thereby 
earn offset credits, than to find a way to cut power plant CO2 
emissions, offsets will become the cost-effective compliance option. 
According to one industry source, offsets are a “main avenue of 
compliance,” because there is little that can be done at an existing 
fossil-fuel-fired facility to control CO2 emissions.324 Viewed in this 
context, at the margin, offsets are a significant and critical component 
of total compliance with regulatory carbon reduction requirements. A 
10% realization in RGGI offset credits from activities other than 
reductions at regulated power plants can equate to 100% of required 
RGGI carbon reductions required by 2019. Offsets can be a 
mechanism for all reductions if the cost of allowance trades increases. 
B. “ADDITIONALITY,” LEGAL PRECEDENT 
The quid pro quo for offsets has been the requirement for 
additionality: additionality has become a legal requirement for 
qualifying for a carbon emission offset under both the international 
Kyoto Protocol, the EU-ETS, and the first ten U.S. states to regulate 
carbon under RGGI. Additionality even trumps any requirement to 
have an offset substitute renewable energy generation for high-
carbon-emitting conventional power generation. Under the only 
results available to date, the CDM Kyoto offsets are principally 
avoiding renewable energy projects in favor of higher-return 
abatement of HFCs and burning of methane without using it to 
generate power.325 
So from where did the legal definition of additionality emanate 
and how does it influence or contort U.S. and world carbon policy? 
There are at least eight different tests of additionality, none of which 
is commonly accepted as credible.326 Retailers of offsets provide little 
information or claim that their offsets are additional, but the U.S. 
GAO found that some sellers cannot explain how they define 
                                                          
 323. CARBON OFFSETS, supra note 8, at 33. 
 324. RGGI Officials Facing Unresolved Questions Over Offset-Project 
Policy, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Aug. 12, 2008, 
http://carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/show/rggi_officials_facing
_unresolved_questions_over_offset_project_policy/. 
 325. See supra Part VII.A. 
 326. CARBON OFFSETS, supra note 8, at 26–27. 
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additionality and provide little verifiable information to buyers.327 
This made offsets less credible and could compromise the integrity of 
a carbon reduction system.328 
Additionality is a legal rather than technical or engineering 
concept. Additionality has no technical analogue, as every ton of 
carbon reduction has technical value in reducing atmospheric 
concentrations, regardless of whether additional or how or why 
obtained. Therefore, additionality is a legal rationing mechanism 
rather than an embodiment of any technical reality. Stakeholders 
surveyed by the U.S. GAO believed that additionality is not a critical 
factor and barriers to entry of carbon reduction strategies must be 
lowered, especially since there is no accepted definition of it.329 
Legal additionality in the case of carbon control is a regulatory 
concept to ration the creation and use of certain intangible regulatory 
assets representing the reduction of carbon. The actual impact of 
additionality is to reduce the net quantity of available traded 
allowances in a regulatory system. The additionality requirement does 
nothing to reduce total GHG emissions, but it does reduce the 
availability of eligible GHG reduction offset credits. This reduction in 
supply will tend to increase the market-clearing price in trading of 
eligible GHG reduction offsets. The purpose of additionality is to 
prevent subsidizing or double-counting business-as-usual 
investments in certain projects. Therefore, additionality prevents 
cross-subsidy through the carbon regulatory system at the 
microeconomic level of certain investments, but actually decreases 
the supply and thus increases the cost of remaining eligible offset 
projects.  
Additionality as a legal concept originally was added to the four 
requirements for U.S. Clean Air Act Emission Reduction Credits 
(“ERC”) for NOx, and later was adapted by the states for carbon 
offsets.330 There have been five prior cap-and-trade emission markets 
established in the United States: Acid rain (SO2),331 NOx summer 
ozone budget program (12 state NOs),332 EPA’s Clean Air Interstate 
                                                          
 327. Id. at 30. 
 328. Id. at 31. 
 329. Id. at 25–26. 
 330. See FERREY, supra note *, at § 6:86. 
 331. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (2008). This cut 
approximately in half electric power SO2 emissions from coal-fired plants. 
 332. This covers the electric utility industry from the ozone season of 
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Rule (“CAIR”) scheduled to start in 2009 (NOx and SO2), 333 the 
Mercury Rule scheduled to commence in 2010 (mercury from power 
plants), 334 and RECLAIM335 in southern California (NOx and SO2). All 
but RECLAIM, a program under SCAQMD,336 have been administered 
by the U.S. EPA. All allowances under each of these five prior 
programs, also including Kyoto and EU-ETS allowances, were not 
auctioned but were allocated free to traditional emitters of the 
pollutant based on average unit heat input (e.g. acid rain program) or 
depending on state-specific programs (e.g. summer ozone).337 
But all has not gone smoothly with these prior cap-and-trade 
emission programs. The two most recent of these cap-and-trade 
programs, the CAIR NOx and SO2 trading rules and the mercury 
trading rules, were ruled legally impermissible and stricken in 2008 
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.338 Most 
recently, in mid-2008, the D.C. Circuit vacated EPA’s CAIR which 
required twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia to reduce of 
regional NOx emissions and regional SO2 emissions below 2003 levels 
by 2015 starting in 2009, and eliminate “significant” contributions to 
downwind states’ air pollution.339 The court declared that it found 
                                                          
May through September of each year. Targeted reductions of NOx from 
electric power facilities have escalated from about 60% reduction to about 
75% reduction during phase II. 
 333. Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter, 70 
Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51 and 72). 
 334. Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary 
Sources, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
60, 72, and 75). 
 335. REgional CLean Air Incentives Market. This was targeted to limit 
emissions in Southern California from a heterogeneous group of 
industries. Although there is no formal banking, because of two 
overlapping reporting periods each year, allowances can be carried beyond 
their nominal expiration for six months. 
 336. South Coast Air Quality Management District, RECLAIM, 
www.aqmd.gov/RECLAIM/index.htm (last visited May 5, 2009).  
 337. Statement of Peter Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office, 
“Containing the Cost of a Cap-and-Trade Program for Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions,” before U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources, May 20, 2008, at 9; EU-ETS Council Directive, Art. 10, 2003 
O.J. (L 275)(EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:320030087:EN:HTML; Roman 
Kramarchuk, All-Out Auctions?, ENVTL. FIN., Mar. 2007, at 45, available at 
http://www.environmentalmarkets.org/galleries/default-
file/Kramarchuk%20ef3marketview_p45.pdf. 
 338. See, New Jersey v. E.P.A., 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (striking 
mercury rule). 
 339. North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The court 
FERREY S.  When 1 + 1 No Longer Equals 2: The New Math of Legal "Additionality"  
Controlling World and U.S. Global Warming Regulation.  MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
2009;10(2): 591-670. 
650 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 10:2 
 
 
“more than several fatal flaws in the rule” and remanded to EPA to 
promulgate a new rule consistent with the opinion.340 This has raised 
questions as to whether the EPA can use a cap-and-trade system to 
address National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) 
attainment in downwind states under the Clean Air Act for fine 
particulate matter, SO2, NOx and ozone.341 
Aside from their legality, how have these programs achieved 
success? The SO2 cap-and-trade program is largely viewed as the 
classic success in reducing a third of power plant emissions through 
a tradable cap-and-trade system.342 However, even this reduction, 
which was achieved over approximately the prior decade during which 
compliance requirements were phased in, does not serve well as a 
template for GHG carbon reductions. SO2 reductions affected only 
111 discrete power facilities principally in the Midwest, among the 
approximately 4800 grid-connected power generation facilities in the 
United States—approximately 2% of power facilities.343 It was also 
limited in terms of both geography and emissions sources.344 It was 
not economy-wide, albeit no national experience exists with a cap-
and-trade system affecting all industrial activities beyond power 
generation.345 
The benefits and achievements of this SO2 program were not 
largely from trading of allowances. Instead, the availability of more 
low-sulfur coal at less expensive prices caused the shift to lower 
sulfur fuel and the resulting lower SO2 emissions.346 Most of the SO2 
allowance trades that did occur were between power plants owned by 
the same company, rather than between companies.347 The SO2 
                                                          
questioned the EPA’s ability to define “significant” contribution of air 
pollution from one state crossing into another state. The EPA previously 
had defended this ability in prior challenges to the NOx SIP Call. Id. at 
907–08. 
 340. Id. at 901. 
 341. Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and 
Ozone, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,165 (May 12, 2005) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 
72–74, 77, 78, and 96). 
 342. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ACID RAIN PROGRAM 2005 PROGRESS 
REPORT 2–10 (2006), 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarket/progress/docs/2005report.pdf. 
 343. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (2008). 
 344. Id. 
 345. See id. 
 346. Curtis A. Moore, The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments: Failing the 
Acid Test, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10366, 10379 (2004). 
 347. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE U.S.: 
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program resulted in little technology innovation, no switch to 
renewable power sources, and primarily fuel switching of the coal 
source to lower SO2 emissions. 
These prior EPA emission trading programs focused on refineries 
and the utility industry as primary sources, overlooking other families 
of GHG pollutants and numerous sources of all sizes.348 While about 
one-third of carbon originates from power generation facilities and 
another one-quarter from transportation through hundreds of 
millions of individual vehicle operations, billions of additional, smaller 
industrial, commercial, and residential sources contribute CO2 from 
fossil-fuel combustion.349 Note that RGGI, for example, only 
addresses larger power plants and not other sectors of the economy 
and not smaller or cogenerating power plants.350 
Carbon regulation can occur at different points of the economy. If 
regulation of carbon occurs upstream, it is simpler in that carbon 
emissions and fuels are addressed at the point they first enter the 
economy. For fossil fuels, this dramatically reduces the number of 
entities to be regulated. However, when CO2 regulation occurs at the 
state levels, as it does in the United States, this raises legal issues as 
states may try, at least indirectly, to regulate external upstream 
sources producing power in interstate commerce.351 Regulating CO2 
at the state level invokes a classic “race to the bottom” paradigm: 
because there is no direct local impact from CO2 emissions since 
greenhouse gases released anywhere on Earth warm the entire 
planet’s atmosphere rather than exert local pollutant impacts, there 
may be a temptation for some states to not effectively restrict state 
CO2 emissions within their states, relying on other states to bear the 
burden.352 
If regulation instead occurs downstream at the point that fossil 
fuel is consumed or burned, the number of regulated entities expands 
exponentially. Individual residential consumers are responsible for at 
                                                          
EXPERIENCE, LESSONS, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 50 
n.15 (2003), 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/emissions_trading.pdf. 
 348. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2006 2–4 (2008), 
www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usinventoryreport.html. 
 349. Id. at 2–9. 
 350. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-1.4(a) (mentioning power plants with 
capacity equal to or greater than 25MWe). 
 351. See Ferrey, supra note 117. 
 352. Erica Herrero-Martinez, “States Sudy Carbon Trading,” WALL 
STREET J., Aug. 1, 2007, at B5A. 
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least one-third of all carbon emissions and as a group constitute the 
largest single share.353 Yet no one is now advocating grasping this 
“third rail” of regulating residential downstream sources who also 
vote. Coverage of sufficient downstream sources becomes much more 
complex. The current ability to trade allowances created for leaded 
gas, SO2 and NOx all adopted downstream regulation. However, each 
was dealing with a finite number of refineries or power plants, not 
with tens of millions of emitters of carbon.  
C. MONITORING AND VERIFICATION OF CARBON CONTROLS 
Concern exists about the integrity of offsets.354 “The vast 
majority of offsets are, at some level, just rip-offsets,” according to a 
former Clinton administration official.355 Additionality has become 
the regulatory test for integrity, although without any certain or 
accepted tool to verify. The GAO concluded that the verification of 
“additionality” was burdensome and overly bureaucratic,356 extremely 
subjective and often manipulated, and frustrated stakeholders. 
Regulatory additionality is made more complex because it 
requires a baseline against which to measure reductions. Reductions 
are only additional when above a project-specific or standardized 
baseline. The baseline requires accurate measurement, correct 
counting for attribution, and permanence of the reduction.357 Double-
counting can occur, for example, where one region or nation installs a 
renewable power generation project, another region or nation 
purchases the power from the project, and yet another nation or state 
purchases the virtual renewable energy credits associated with the 
project. Which can claim the carbon reduction attributes? 
This becomes even more challenging where one region regulates 
carbon and another does not. Accessing possible “leakage” into the 
system of regulated carbon emissions from other unregulated sources 
poses an additional problem. Because power moves almost at the 
speed of light and is not precisely traceable as to source and offset 
credits, as a virtual regulatory creation, move subject to different legal 
rules, there can be conflicts and challenges. However, additionality is 
                                                          
 353. Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinmann, The Carbon-
Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1691–94 (2007). 
 354. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 305, at CRS-18. 
 355. CARBON CONTROL NEWS, supra note 295. 
 356. INT’L CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 261, at 46–48. 
 357. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra 305, at CRS-18 to CRS-21. 
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the most significant challenge.358 
The measures of additionality for purposes of environmental 
emission credits trading are extremely imprecise. First, developing a 
baseline “business as usual” scenario against which to measure what 
is additional, is subject to significant assumptions. Against this 
“business as usual” scenario, actual carbon savings are calculated 
and assumed to be an emission reduction.359 Many additional NOx 
ERC-creating projects traditionally earn credits by shutting down for 
economic or political reasons, rather than actually implementing 
emission-saving measures associated with continued operation or 
output.360 Similar reductions or shut-downs may or may not also be 
eligible for creating carbon offsets.361 This topic is currently 
controversial in the European Union and also in California as it 
designs its regulation.362 
Second, looking at international precedent, calculation of Kyoto 
Protocol CDM project-based offsets are generally linear extrapolations 
of models, which may not be representative of what actually occurs on 
the ground, as shown by the significant overestimation of CDM 
credits. For the first 175 CDM projects that issued CERs, the 
validation procedure overestimated the number of CERs produced by 
approximately 27% on average, with a standard deviation error of 
42.5%.363 Verification can be an inside game: three firms have been 
collectively involved in verifying more than 80% of the first 740 CDM 
projects that were registered under the Kyoto Protocol.364 In the 
United States, a California legislative committee moved forward on 
legislation that would require sellers of offsets to hire independent 
third-party verification to ensure that offsets are legitimate and meet 
state protocols and requirements.365 
Third, issuing credits on a project-by-project basis increases 
                                                          
 358. Id. at CRS-24. 
 359. Regional Clean Air Incentives Market, (Feb 14, 2008), 
http://www.aqmd.gov/RECLAIM/reclaim.html. 
 360. See Activists Split Over Support of GHG Offsets for Plant Closures, 
INSIDE THE EPA, Sept. 5, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 16718143 
(detailing controversies across United States regarding plant closures). 
 361. Id. 
 362. See supra Part IV.B. 
 363. Hart, supra note 269, at 42. 
 364. Id. 
 365. California Lawmakers Advance Bill Requiring GHG Offset 
Verification, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Apr. 15, 2008, 
http://www.carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/show/california_law
makers_advance_bill_requiring_ghg_offset_verification. 
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inaccuracy because any pattern of deviation from actuality is then 
multiplied over a large number of small transactions. The fact that 
national “compliance” was shown so easily in 2006 in the European 
Union carbon trading scheme, after early predictions of shortfall,366 
indicates that political flexibility to demonstrate compliance on paper 
often masks the true reduction. Despite this apparent compliance 
with goals to significantly cut annual GHG emissions, rather than 
declining in either 2006 or 2007, world GHGs actually climbed 2.9% 
from 2006 to 2007.367 
The process of certification of more or less offsets can result in 
significant swings in offset and allowance trading prices.368 There are 
several regulatory mechanisms to reduce price volatility in the cost of 
CO2 emission allowances or offsets. The first is to create banking 
across various periods of time so that excess credits from one period 
are transferable to the next period, increasing the longevity of long-
term offset supply and depressing trading prices. For example, the 
EU-ETS system allows annual banking of allowances (although not 
from Phase I ending in 2007 to Phase II beginning in 2008),369 which 
works to dampen any short-term price swings in allowance or offset 
availability and trade pricing. 
The second mechanism to reduce price volatility is to allow 
borrowing against future credits not yet created. The E.U. program 
allows borrowing of next-year allowances to satisfy current-year 
allowance requirements.370 The third mechanism is to create a safety 
valve that caps the cost of emission allowances at a set price, has the 
government release into the market surplus allowances at a set price, 
or creates additional, wider types of eligible credits and offsets to 
increase supply under certain pricing conditions. The RGGI model 
adopts the third mechanism through use of pricing triggers at which a 
                                                          
 366. See supra Part VI.B. 
 367. Juliet Eilperin, Greenhouse Gases Continue to Build Despite 
Agreements, B.GLOBE, Sept. 26, 2008, at A13. 
 368. See supra notes 316–319. 
 369. 2003 O.J. (L 275) at art. 14. See generally A. DANNY ELLERMAN & 
PAUL L. JOSKOW, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN 
UNION’S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE (2008), 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-
Report.pdf (analyzing development, structure, and performance of EU-
ETS). 
 370. Council Directive 2003/87/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (amending 
Council Directive 96/61/EC); Commission Regulation 916/2007, art. 51, 
2007 O.J. (L 200) 12 (EC). 
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larger percentage amount and a wider variety of credits from more 
geographic regions can satisfy an increasing percentage over time of 
compliance responsibilities.371 
In a market with tradable credits, additionality does not reward 
the obvious or cost-effective or best investments precisely because 
such investments are economically feasible anyway, and therefore not 
additional. In other words, to satisfy additionality, energy investors 
would forsake the best investment and invest in something that is 
marginal to qualify it as additional to normal investments. 
Additionality requirements for offsets increase transaction costs for 
certifying credits.372 
What is not a requirement, but looms as an extremely profound 
issue, especially where most nations or U.S. states are not currently 
regulating carbon, is the potential “leakage” of emissions from other 
regions that substitute cheaper, higher-carbon power. The CDM CERs 
and other green credits share some characteristics with other 
commodity-based asset classes. They are non self-liquidating assets: 
forward delivery contracts are delivered for the CERs and the 
receivable is dependent on the performance of the project generating 
the CERs. Unlike commodity-based asset classes, there may not be 
any commodity that is created backstopping the CO2e reductions 
accomplished, unless it is a renewable energy project which does 
create the energy commodity or service.373 
However, environmental groups have questioned the additionality 
of renewable energy projects if their construction cannot prove to be 
valuable because of the offset sale.374 Renewable power investments 
are not recognized as carbon offsets because “the emission reduction 
doesn’t occur at the site of the renewable generator,” but in backing 
out other carbon-intensive generation.375 Under the current 
construct, the coal, power, and railroad industries have threatened 
some states with suit over the RGGI program.376 
                                                          
 371. See infra Part VIII.B. 
 372. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 305, at CRS-17. 
 373. For a discussion of whether electricity production is a good or a 
service, see Steven Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe, 
14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1839 (2004). 
 374. Activists Split Over Support of GHG Offsets for Plant Closures, 
supra note 360. 
 375. Id. 
 376. First RGGI Allowance Auction May Trigger Coal Industry Lawsuits, 
CARBON CONTROL NEWS, July 21, 2008, 
http://www.carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/show/first_rggi_allo
wance_auction_may_trigger_coal_industry_lawsuits. 
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D. WORLD CARBON REGULATION COMPARED ON RENEWABLE 
POWER: E.U., KYOTO, AND RGGI 
1. Indulgences and Actions 
Offsets have been likened to “environmental indulgences,” where 
any person, no matter how profligate in emissions, can utilize the 
purchase of virtual verified reductions created elsewhere, to neutralize 
one’s net carbon emissions in gross.377 Creating offsets is an 
alternative, lower-cost path to reduce the private cost of compliance 
with CO2 requirements at a carbon-emitting facility.378 Additionality 
is the legal gatekeeper as to what qualifies as either an international 
Kyoto, E.U., or U.S. RGGI state offset. Additionality is a qualitative 
legal gatekeeper that eschews rational energy decision making in 
certain markets. Additionality is failing to motivate a dramatic shift to 
a renewable generating base in either developed or developing 
countries. 
Where international offsets are eligible as options to create 
compliance, one expects the potentially lower cost of implementing 
carbon offsets in developing countries to dominate the early years of 
offset creation.379 International-only, as opposed to domestic, offsets 
are part of both the EU-ETS and Kyoto Protocol.380 
Despite the emergence of, and attention to, renewable energy 
sources, forecasters do not see the international technology mix of 
power generation sources changing appreciably over the next several 
decades.381 The percentage of fossil fuels in the mix—and thus the 
                                                          
 377. Joshua S. Gans, Do Voluntary Carbon Offsets Work?, THE 
ECONOMISTS’ VOICE , Oct. 2007, 
http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss4/art7. The author provides the 
illustration that former Vice President Al Gore had electricity usage more 
than twenty times the average usage, but countered that he “offset” those 
emissions through carbon offsets and green power consumption. In 
essence, Gans argues that the profligate carbon users can purchase 
indulgences. Id. 
 378. Billy Tizer, Resources for the Future, Presentation at June 
Harvard Electricity Policy Forum (June 2007) (notes on file with author). 
 379. EPA, CLIMATE STEWARDSHIP, supra note 314, at CRS-25. 
 380. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, supra note 189, art. 12; LARRY PARKER, U.S. CONG. RES. 
SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME (ETS): 
KYOTO AND BEYOND (2008), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34150.pdf. 
 381. Clark Gelling, Elec. Power Research Inst., Presentation at Aegis 
Conference (July 25, 2007). 
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potential sources of GHGs in the electric power sector—is forecast to 
remain relatively constant. The International Energy Agency in Paris 
predicts that by 2030 world demand for energy will grow by 59% and 
fossil fuel sources will still supply 82% of the total, with non-carbon 
renewable energy sources supplying only 14%.382 
The importance of the electric sector in global warming 
abatement is reflected in its changing role. In 1949, only 11% of 
global warming gases in the United States came from the electric 
sector; today it is more than 40%.383 The Energy Information 
Administration in 2008 concluded that the electric power sector 
offered the more cost-effective opportunities to reduce CO2 emissions, 
when compared to the transportation sector.384 The power sector will 
therefore be the carbon reduction focus, and the place where 
additionality has its primary application. The types of technologies in 
the power generation capital stock largely determine the long-term 
concentrations of atmospheric carbon. 
One would assume that renewable-energy policy and carbon 
policy, each aiming to provide the generating base with lower-carbon 
power resources, would be closely aligned to meet policy objectives. 
More than half the states have RPS programs to promote renewable 
generation.385 The RGGI, and the Western and Midwestern states’ 
carbon regulation schemes collectively include about half of the U.S. 
states plus four Canadian provinces. Those states that are 
participating in the RGGI scheme, along with California, alone are 
significant in scale. Their emissions approach the total emissions of 
the nation of Japan, one of the two largest carbon-emitting 
participants in the Kyoto Protocol. The offset and additionality policies 
of these various carbon programs, however, seem not similarly or 
consistently aligned. 
2. The RGGI Angle 
First, distinguish the offsets and allowances concerning 
                                                          
 382. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 37, at 58. 
 383. See generally Table 2.1f Electric Power Sector Energy 
Consumption, 1949-2007, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/txt/ptb0201f.html (last visited May 7, 2009).  
 384. Energy Estimates Show Rise in CO2 Emissions, Offer Mitigation 
Options, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Jun 26, 2008, 
http://www.carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/show/energy_estima
tes_show_rise_in_co2_emissions_offer_mitigation_options. 
 385. There are twenty-five states in the United States that have 
announced that they will regulate carbon in the four U.S. state regulatory 
schemes announced. See supra Parts III, IV, V. 
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additionality requirements. While RGGI includes the offset 
requirement of additionality, there is no concept of additionality in 
either the RGGI original allocation of carbon allowances among the 
ten individual RGGI states or in the secondary allocation through 
those states to those who acquire such allowances by either auction 
or allocation. 
a. Allowances 
There is a proposal to make additionality an additional 
requirement in early-reduction RGGI allowances achieved at fossil-
fuel projects.386 This would transform such allowances, which 
typically do not require additionality, to the have the equivalent 
requirement of offsets, which do require additionality. Early 
compliance was also incorporated in another U.S. credit trading 
program for SO2.387 It did not require additionality be demonstrated 
for early compliance. To make things even more disconsonant, by 
definition, offsets cannot be created at fossil-fuel-fired power 
projects,388 although early-reduction allowances will be created at 
existing fossil-fuel fired projects. 
If the requirement of RGGI is to hold CO2 emissions at their 
historic levels and then permanently reduce CO2 emissions after 
2014,389 allowing 2006 to 2008 early reductions to be shifted in time 
so that they are used as if they were 2009 reductions does not directly 
contribute to this requirement to limit current carbon emissions. 
However, if continued long-term, there may be value in allowing credit 
for early reductions. Since CO2 emissions become a carbon 
concentration in the atmosphere lasting for a century, any reduction 
accomplished in the past century is of value globally and might be of 
creditable value in a regulatory system.390 
Some states have gone even further with earlier allowances not 
requiring additionality. For example, Massachusetts, which prior to 
joining RGGI regulated GHG emissions from six large fossil-fueled 
power generation facilities,391 also will allow some of these terminated 
                                                          
 386. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-5.3(c). 
 387. EPA Bidding Rules, 40 C.F.R. §73.71(a)-(f). 
 388. See RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-10.3(d)(2). 
 389. See RGGI Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 61, at 3 
(delineating emission reduction timeline). 
 390. See Steven Ferrey, Corporate Responsibility and Carbon-Based Life 
Form, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 419 (2008). 
 391. Emission Standards for Power Plants, 310 C.M.R. § 7.29(6)–(7). 
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prior program elements to create transferred RGGI offsets. This will 
apply to RGGI- ineligible offset projects because these projects are 
required by other law and would involve state set asides from 
Massachusetts’ RGGI allowance portfolio.392 In essence, it allows 
prior expenditures on carbon projects required by law in 
Massachusetts under a different regulation to create RGGI allowances 
from early efforts, which by definition are not additional to what is 
required by law and therefore normally ineligible. 
b. Offsets 
Additionality is required in all RGGI offsets. Renewability or 
renewable power is not required in any offsets. In fact, renewable 
energy projects are not allowed to create RGGI offsets.393 Offsets are a 
substitute mode reducing carbon emissions from other than fossil-
fired power plants, while the RGGI program only regulates CO2 
emissions from fossil-fueled power plants. Even in the United States, 
methane is being flared to garner offsets, even though such flaring is 
not additional, and could create power rather than just being flared 
as a waste material.394 Notwithstanding this, RGGI early compliance 
allowances—but not offsets—recognize CO2 reductions at the same 
covered power projects. 
RGGI offsets must be projects commenced on or after December 
20, 2005,395 while early-compliance RGGI allowances can be 
commenced prior to, on, or after January 1, 2009.396 These early 
reduction allowances under RGGI are created by shifting the timing of 
compliance in an opposite direction from that applying for offsets, 
utilizing a timing ceiling rather than a timing floor. One is not allowed 
to register under the RGGI program and other carbon programs 
simultaneously.397 Offsets also cannot be awarded for voluntary 
participation in programs or for elements required by law.398 
If a project is located outside of a participating RGGI state, the 
                                                          
 392. Nicholas Bianco, GHG Stakeholder Meeting—Rule Review: 
Transitioning from 7.29 to RGGI, Apr. 5 & 10, 2007, available at 
http://www.mass.gov/dep/air/climate/rggi3p1.pdf. 
 393. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-10.3(d)(2). 
 394. Rethinking Offsets, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Oct. 6, 2008, 
http://www.carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/show/rethinking_off
sets. 
 395. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-10.3(f). 
 396. Id. § XX-10.4(b)(1). 
 397. Id. § XX-10.3(d)(4). 
 398. Id. § XX-10.3(d)(1), (4). 
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sponsor of the offset project can pick any RGGI state in which to file 
its credits.399 There could be some arbitrage here, as any offset 
project would have to be registered in just one RGGI state, and then 
could, if an MOU is in place, could be traded into another RGGI state. 
The flexibility, however, of different RGGI states in terms of registering 
offset projects under local state rules can vary. 
 RGGI contains circuit-breaker triggers that change the use and 
location of eligible offsets.400 Once RGGI offsets are trading in the 
market at greater than $7 per ton over a one-year period, credits 
created from anywhere in North America can provide up to 5% of 
compliance, as opposed to 3.3% normally.401 Once the market price 
of offsets increases above $10 per ton twice in two consecutive years, 
offsets can be obtained from anywhere in the world without any 
discount.402 The purpose of this is to increase the number of 
available offsets if prices for them rise because of a lack of adequate 
supply. 
The RGGI system is inverted. While RGGI, like Kyoto, requires 
offset additionality but does not require renewability, RGGI goes even 
further to specify that renewable power projects expressly do not 
qualify to create any offsets. The media have questioned the credibility 
of carbon offsets403 and the efficacy of such offsets.404 The 
uncertainty about carbon regulation and the differential impact on 
various sources of generation have caused U.S. industry to postpone 
needed investments in new generation sources.405 With increasing 
demand for power and the aging generation fleet of existing power 
service units, this state of affairs cannot proceed indefinitely. 
California is considering allowing RECs to also count for carbon 
                                                          
 399. Steven Ferrey, Power Paradox: The Algorithm of Carbon and 
International Development, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 510 (2008). 
 400. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 401. RGGI Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 61, at 5. 
 402. Id. at 3, 5–6. 
 403. See Andrew Revkin, Carbon Neutral Is Hip, but Is It Green? N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 29, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/29/weekinreview/29revkin.html. 
 404. See id.; see also Ben Elgin, Little Green Lies, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 
29, 2007, 45 (arguing that the ability to make a company green while 
making it profitable may not always be attainable). 
 405. Timothy P. Gardner & James C. Hendrickson, Carbon War Games: 
U.S. Utilities Gain Strategic Insights by Playing Out a Carbon-Constraint 
Scenario, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 2007, at 46. 
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reduction.406 Some activists are trying to limit out-of-state offset 
credit for out-of-California renewable energy project offsets.407 
Southern California utilities are urging no restrictions on out-of-state 
renewable energy credits.408 
The California carbon program has not yet made its final 
decisions for additionality and renewability of offset projects, prior to 
its commencement in 2012. The carbon programs of the Western and 
Midwestern states also have not made their final decisions.409 
Therefore, the RGGI scheme is the U.S. model for legal additionality 
and its effect on renewable power in carbon programs.410 
3. Kyoto Conundrum 
Additionality is in the text of the Kyoto Protocol: emission 
credits/offsets must be “supplemental to domestic actions for the 
purpose of meeting quantified emission limitations and reduction 
commitments . . . .”411 With Kyoto, verifying additionality is enough, 
but there is no requirement for more renewable resource deployment. 
Kyoto has additionality without renewability. 
The effect of CDM projects has not been to promote appropriate 
renewable investments in developing countries, but rather to create 
transferable additional credits for Annex 1 countries.412 There is no 
mandatory environmental or sustainability assessment in Kyoto 
projects or public input, which was rejected by the Kyoto developing 
countries as an infringement on host country sovereignty.413 There 
are almost a thousand CDM projects, with twice that many in the 
project development pipeline. The existing projects have generated 
                                                          
 406. “Utility Argues renewable Credit Trading Key to California GHG 
Cuts,” CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Sept. 29, 2008, at 3; Montana Inaction on 
GHGs Signals Trouble for Regional Trading Plan, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, 
Sept. 26, 2008, 
http://www.carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/show/montana_inac
tion_on_ghgs_may_signal_collapse_of_regional_trading_plan. 
 407. Utility Argues Renewable Credit Trading Key to California GHG 
Cuts, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Sept. 29, 2008. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Steven Ferrey, Converting Brownfield Environmental Negatives into 
Energy Positives, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 417 (2007). 
 410. Gerald B. Silverman, Regional Initiative Holds First Auction in 
Nation of Carbon Emissions Allowances, 39 ENV’T REP. 1913 (2008). 
 411. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, supra note 189, art. 17. 
 412. Voigt, supra note 301, at 18. 
 413. Id. at 17. 
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117 million issued CERs, with an estimated 2.6 billion CERs to be 
generated by 2012. 414 This would represent almost 10% of monitored 
emissions. 
The early experience from the E.U. trading scheme paralleling the 
Kyoto Protocol illustrates, similarly, that many industries are buying 
offset credits created under CDM in developing countries, rather than 
making significant energy or carbon reductions at their European 
regulated industrial facilities.415 Rather than cut fossil fuel use in 
developed countries, the response has been to create CER offsets in 
developing countries. To date, these typically do not use renewable 
resources, which when transferred then increase the entire cap 
emission quantity of available emissions in developed countries.416 
This creates an incentive for host CDM countries417 and CDM 
investors at lowest cost to increase the number of CERs created.418 
CDM projects to date have focused on increasing the number of CERs 
created for investors, instead of focusing on renewable energy projects 
and sustainable energy alternatives in fast-electrifying developing 
countries, such as China.419 
Emission allowance and offset trading are allowed under the EU-
ETS and the Kyoto Protocol.420 Therefore, any party, even if for 
purposes of speculation, can purchase E.U. or RGGI offset credits, 
even if they do not themselves require them for compliance. While 
offsets are equivalent to allowances in both environmental and 
economic terms, they are not interchangeable without limitations.421 
The lesser price at which CERs have traded compared to EUAs 
creates arbitrage opportunities. The actual allowances can have 
                                                          
 414. Id. at 15. 
 415. Jeffrey Ball, supra note 14. 
 416. Jeffrey Ball, supra note 14. 
 417. Under the Kyoto scheme, the host country for the CDM project 
gets to determine whether the project satisfies its sustainable 
development goals. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
[UNFCCC], Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its second session, held at Nairobi from 
6 to 17 November 2006, UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/10/Add.1 (March 
2, 2007) [hereinafter UNFCCC, Second Session], 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2006/cmp2/eng/10a01.pdf. 
 418. Voigt, supra note 301, at 15. 
 419. Id. at 17–18, n. 41–42. 
 420. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, supra note 189, art. 20; UNFCCC, Seventh Session, 
supra note 240, at 18/CP.7. 
 421. PARKER, supra note 380, at 32. 
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greater value than external offsets created under CDM and imported 
back to an Annex I nation. Contracts for differences can be employed 
to hedge future carbon requirements.422 
As of the end of 2006, the World Bank reports that CDM offset 
projects under the Kyoto Protocol were located 61% in China, 12% in 
India, 7% in other Asian countries, 10% in Latin America (most 
significantly Brazil), and 3% in Africa.423 Therefore one developing 
country, China, dominated the other 170 developing countries 
collectively, as the locus of CDM projects. Since Kyoto CDM CER 
offsets must be created in developing countries, sovereign and 
commercial interests are subject to the risks associated with these 
intangible regulatory assets.424 
This risk is mitigated by the oversight of U.N. designated 
authorities in each such nation that hosts a CDM project.425 
Questions have been raised, however, concerning whether the Kyoto 
Executive Board and panels will correctly monitor the incentive to 
inflate CERs.426 In August 2008, the United Nations administrators of 
the Kyoto Protocol announced that they would try to tighten the 
ability of speculators to earn CDM credits for improving already 
existing and profitable projects.427 This would originally apply to 
biomass projects.428 
A report by the World Wildlife Fund found that many CDM 
programs fail to support sustainable development in host CDM 
countries.429 The same study found that 20% of the CDM projects 
                                                          
 422. A contract for differences typically involves a financial institution 
acting as the intermediary to agree to supply a certain quantity of carbon 
credits in the future at a fixed price and then covering this with a second 
contract with a different entity to supply the same quantity of credits at 
that future date at the then market price. The difference between the two 
prices becomes a settlement amount between the two parties. 
 423. Lauren Etter, In China, A Plan to Turn Rice into Carbon Credits, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2007, at A1. 
 424. For treatment of sovereign risk and commercial risk in developing 
countries, see FERREY, supra note * at § 3:10. Commercial risk is 
mitigated by pooling CERs from different technologies and from different 
countries in financial instruments for trading. 
 425. For specification of DNAs, see List of Annex I Parties, supra note 4. 
 426. Voigt, supra note 301, at 16. 
 427. Cracking Down on Offset Projects, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Aug. 6, 
2008. 
 428. Id. 
 429. Voigt, supra note 301, at n.9 (quoting Lambert Schneider, Öko-
Institute, Energy & Climate Prot. Div., Practical Experiences with the 
Environmental Integrity of the CDM (June 15, 2007)), available at 
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would have occurred notwithstanding CDM qualification and 
therefore were not “additional, while another study found that one-
third of projects in India failed to demonstrate their additionality from 
what would have otherwise been implemented.430 The report argued 
that this will result in the production of a large quantity of cheap 
carbon credits, which would allow businesses and developed 
countries to avoid a fast shift to renewable resources and to keep 
polluting.431 According to one recent witness before the European 
Union, “Additionality is often subjective,” and there should be “more 
independent and transparent” evidence of additionality under the 
CDM offset system.432 
E. THE ROLE OF FOREST “ADDITIONALITY” 
Forests are the missing piece in the carbon equation. Forests are 
renewable. But their potential role as a harvested renewable biomass 
power generation fuel does not make them eligible to create offsets. 
Instead, their role as living forests in naturally absorbing and 
converting carbon molecules makes them eligible for offset creation 
and credit. Forests use carbon dioxide as building blocks for organic 
molecules and store it in woody tissues, but that process is not 
indefinite. Forests store about 45% of terrestrial carbon, and remove 
from the atmosphere about 33% of the anthropogenic carbon emitted 
annually.433 Tropical forests are responsible for about one-quarter of 
this absorption, yet deforestation is fastest in tropical forests in South 
America and Africa.434 Forests represent a better opportunity to 
sequester CO2 currently in the atmosphere, in contrast to the 
proposed controversial sequestration experiments conducted 
underground in mines or in the ocean. 
Annually in the world, about 32 million acres (13 million 
hectares) of forest are destroyed and not replanted.435 The 
                                                          
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/4thmeeting/8a_l
ambert.pdf. 
 430. Id. at 15. 
 431. Id. at 39. 
 432. Stephen Gardner, EU Parliament, Council Making Progress on Post-
2012 Emissions Trading Scheme, 39 ENVTL. REP. 1417, 1419 (2008). 
 433. Gordan Bonan, Forests and Climate Change: Forcings, Feedbacks, 
and the Climate Benefits of Forests, 320 SCI. 1444 (2008); CRS REPORT ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 9, at CRS-1. 
 434. Bonan, supra note 433, at 1445. 
 435. Arthur Max, Deal Struck on Forest in Climate Talks, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Dec. 9, 2008. 
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agricultural sector offers a significant potential for sequestration of 
carbon through preservation of biologic resources.436 The carbon 
stored in the existing forests of the contiguous 48 U.S. states equals 
about 20 years of industrial U.S. carbon emissions.437 Legally, 
however, there has emerged a difference between preserving existing 
forest and afforesting new land. For forestation projects, the integrity, 
additionality, and credibility of offsets credited are controversial 
issues.438 
Leading carbon scientists have submitted that an important way 
to reduce carbon concentrations to even 90% of current levels is to 
adopt “forestry practices that sequester carbon.”439 If carbon 
concentrations stay above this 90% threshold for even a short amount 
of time there may be “irreversible catastrophic effects.”440 
There are several issues with afforestation that revolve around 
additionality; including 1) the efficiency of afforestation projects; 2) 
monitoring and verification of reductions; 3) permanence and 
longevity of forestation projects. 
Biologically-based sequestration projects create issues with 
establishment of the appropriate baseline in a dynamic biologic 
system, the permanence of the reduction given forest change over 
time, and “leakage” from forest destruction focused elsewhere.441 
Forestry offsets provide a challenge for preventing leakage, as logging 
can move to an unregulated region, causing the net world impact to 
be zero. Legal mechanisms to ensure the value of biological credits 
against underperformance of credited value include insurance and 
bond products, buffer or surplus contingency accounts, and 
                                                          
 436. U.S. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33898, CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS: CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF THE U.S. AGRICULTURE SECTOR x 
(June 20, 2008) [hereinafter CRS REPORT ON ROLE OF U.S. AGRICULTURE], 
available at 
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/08July/RL33898.pdf. 
 437. Ecology and Econ. Research Dep’t., Wilderness Soc, Measuring 
Forest Carbon: Strength and Weakness of Available Tools, WILDERNESS 
SOC’Y. SCI. & POLICY BRIEF, Apr. 2008, 
http://wilderness.org/files/Measuring-Forest-Carbon.pdf. 
 438. Forestry CO2 Offsets, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, July 17, 2008, 
http://www.carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/show/forestry_co2_o
ffsets. 
 439. James Hansen, et al., supra note 1, at 217. 
 440. Id. 
 441. See generally Mike Rosen-Molina, Carbon Credit Report: Can 
Buying Carbon Credits to Offset the Greenhouse Gases You Spew in Daily 
Life Really Help Save Us from Global Warming?, MONTHLY, Aug. 2007, 
http://berkeleymonthly.net/feature-08-07.html. 
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covenants on land-use and long-term leases and easements on use of 
covered land. 
A recent Australian study claims that natural forests are 60% 
more efficient than new human-made forests for the purpose of 
sequestering carbon.442 If so, preservation of existing forests is more 
critical than afforestation of new land areas. Yet afforestation is 
eligible to create an offset under Kyoto, EU-ETS or RGGI, while the 
more valuable presently existing forest is not. If the Australian study 
is correct, there is a significant carbon sequestration loss upon the 
destruction of natural forest, even if replaced with new afforestation 
acreage that can earn offsets. Of course, preservation of forests is not 
eligible to create any credits under either the Kyoto Protocol or RGGI. 
There is debate concerning whether such new forestation is 
additional, and how it is monitored and verified. Under the RGGI 
Model Rule, even new afforestation projects, unless insurance against 
biomass loss is purchased for the forest, receive credits equal only to 
90% of their absorption of CO2, to account for possible loss of forest 
mass over time due to fire, pests, or other causes.443 In addition, to 
ensure permanent forest use, a restrictive conservation easement is 
required for new forest projects that create credits.444 For some RGGI 
states, the in-state agricultural opportunities are minimal. California 
is exploring reforestation projects in Mexico to comply with 
California’s imminent carbon GHG cap-and-trade program.445 
Under RGGI, most offset credits have a ten-year period, and are 
eligible for a second ten-year period. New afforestation projects, by 
contrast, are eligible for a three twenty-year credit periods.446 This 
substantially favors the net present value of afforestation projects. By 
comparison, some Kyoto CERs related to forestry projects are deemed 
temporary for a period of up to 60 years,447 subject to verification on 
a recurring 5-year basis that burning or logging does not later release 
carbon from the forest. In the international Kyoto Protocol, forestation 
eligibility treatment is similar to that received in RGGI and the 
                                                          
 442. Growing Forestry Offsets, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Aug. 11, 2008, 
http://www.carboncontrolnews.com. 
 443. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-10.5(c)(4)(iii). 
 444. Id. § XX-10.5(c)(6)(i). 
 445. California Officials Eye Mexico Reforestation Projects for GHG 
Offsets, supra note 151. 
 446. RGGI MODEL RULE § XX-10.3(e)(2). 
 447. CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE TO CARBON LAW AND PRACTICE, supra 
note 265, at 96. 
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European Union: preservation of existing forests does not qualify; 
adding new forests does. Kyoto’s CDM only counts the following: 
projects that involve planting forest in areas that were deforested 
before 1990 and afforestation, defined as planting forest in areas 
where there was previously no forest vegetation for at least 50 
years.448  
Under the Kyoto Protocol, offset carbon credits can be obtained 
for planting trees but not for preserving existing forests. Leading up to 
the Kyoto Protocol, developed nations objected to forest credits, 
arguing that it would be difficult to monitor and measure the amount 
actually preserved, as well as to ensure that preservation would 
endure over time.449 Efforts of some developing countries to include 
avoiding deforestation as a CDM project were tabled in 2005 meetings 
and not resolved at the Kyoto group Bali meetings in late 2007. Thus, 
conservation of forests has been tabled until after 2012 by the Kyoto 
parties. The U.N. IPCC report notes that forest offsets under Kyoto are 
“being lost in the current institutional context and lack of political will 
to implement and has resulted in only a small portion of this potential 
being realized at present.”450 
Even the EU-ETS program excludes forestry credits, including 
those from forestation and reforestation projects. 451 Likewise, forest 
eligibility has been controversial in the consideration of U.S. federal 
legislation. In 2008 there was an effort to expand the farming and 
forestry offsets available under the 2008 Lieberman-Warner carbon 
legislation proposal, which included no-till agricultural practices.452 
This legislation was amended to allow a larger amount of 
                                                          
 448. UNFCCC, First Session, supra note 278. 
 449. Dean Scott & Eric J. Lyman, Negotiators Finalize Measure on 
Forests, Fund for Adapting to Global Warming Effects, 38 ENVTL. REP. 
2699–700 (2007). 
 450. WORKING GROUP III [WGIII], INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 543 
(2007), http://www.mnp.nl/ipcc/pages_media/AR4-chapters.html 
 451. Stuart E. Eizenstat, Seeing the Climate Policy for Trees, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/04/opinion/04eizenstat.html?_r=1&o
ref=slogin. 
 452. America’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. 
(2008); see also Senate Panel Urged to Expand Agriculture Offsets in 
Lieberman-Warner Bill, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, May 27, 2008, 
http://www.carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/show/senate_panel_
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international forest projects to create offsets, allowing up to 15% 
percent use of all offsets to create compliance. An amendment in the 
Senate, however, sought to eliminate offsets created overseas, since 
they would encourage carbon spending in China instead of in the 
United States.453 
So forest preservation, the natural biological mechanism for 
carbon absorption, has become the legal orphan of all U.S., E.U., and 
Kyoto carbon programs. Here, additionality becomes a double-edged 
sword that does little to prevent deforestation, which is proceeding at 
alarming rates. Eligible actual reforestation does not compensate even 
on the order of magnitude of the much greater forest loss. 
Additionality applied to new afforestation only is not preserving the 
best natural renewable resources. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Carbon control is the major environmental challenge now 
confronting the world. The new regulatory requirement for 
additionality is a critically important component of the new carbon 
control regulatory constructs, yet it is infrequently addressed. The 
three carbon regulation schemes in effect today—RGGI in the United 
States, EU-ETS, and the Kyoto Protocol—all require additionality of 
offsets. Additionality has emerged as the dominant and controlling 
meta-screen for legal qualification of offset credits in carbon 
regulation in the United States and around the world. It has become 
even more important than the goal of substituting renewable low-
carbon power generation in place of traditional power generation. As 
such, additionality has even worked as an absolute prohibition 
against any renewable power in the new U.S. carbon regulatory 
schemes. 
As a result, each of the carbon programs has discouraged 
renewable power substitution for traditional power generation and 
has failed to recognize the importance of preserving existing forests as 
biological carbon sequestration mechanisms. The Kyoto system allows 
renewable energy project CDM offsets, where the U.S. RGGI program 
specifically excludes them. All programs exclude the preservation of 
existing forest resources from credit, despite rampant deforestation. 
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But even under the Kyoto Protocol, where renewable CDM offsets are 
allowed, there is not widespread renewable energy technology 
deployment. Rather, the clear majority of CDM offset projects around 
the world are concentrated in one country and avoid renewable energy 
projects. Long-term, these failures to facilitate the necessary 
transition to renewable energy and to protect existing forest in various 
countries threaten to be the death knell of the CDM program. 
It is not too late to make the necessary regulatory transition. 
According to climate scientists, however, there is scant time left: 
climatologist James Hansen notes that if we wait a mere decade until 
2018 to “stop the growth of greenhouse gas emissions,” then we 
reduce the probability of “avoiding catastrophic effects” of warming to 
almost zero.454 The basic world agreement for carbon emission 
control was conceived more than 15 years ago and the Kyoto Protocol 
more than a decade ago, yet success is not evident. Carbon 
concentrations in Kyoto-regulated developed countries, in 
unregulated developing countries, and indeed, throughout the world, 
continue to climb. Rather than declining in 2007, carbon emissions 
from “burning fossil fuels and cement production” actually climbed 
2.9% over the prior year, due primarily from emissions from 
developing countries.455 
Even the transition between state-level and federal carbon 
regulation in the United States poses issues. Pending federal 
legislation creates an interesting conversion among programs: The 
proposed Waxman-Markey carbon legislation provides that any 
allowances issued before 2012 could be exchanged for federal 
allowances based on the average auction price for allowances issued 
in a given year.456 Therefore, conversion of allowances or offsets 
issued or certified during the first 3 years of RGGI, or early reduction 
credits issued in California or the regional state carbon programs, can 
be converted to any new federal carbon currency. This could either 
amplify or mitigate “additionality” concerns raised in this article. 
Additionality employs a new math where the necessary long-term 
investment does not add up. It is a key regulatory concept that must 
be retooled to certify offset projects that recognize and count 
technologies that shift the power generating base to a more 
substantial renewable power component. The concept is one of 
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regulatory math, and that math can be changed to comport with the 
technical component. It now works a disconnect between means and 
ends: the end is a long-term renewable power base and preservation 
of forest cover, but the means—employing additionality—by definition 
preclude reaching the desired end. Reformulating the additionality 
requirement to encourage more renewable power generation projects 
to qualify as offsets and to credit the preservation of existing forest 
canopy that otherwise could be destroyed, is the first legal task for 
reforming carbon regulation. If the uptake of renewable projects in 
either developed or developing countries had been vigorous since the 
2005 initiation of the EU-ETS, or the destruction of existing forest 
canopy had been arrested in developing countries, “additionality” as 
currently defined and required might be justified. However, the failure 
of either achievement requires a new look at the effect and application 
of the ill-defined novel legal concept of additionality in carbon 
regulation. 
 
